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ABSTRACT
Hollywood film projects involving significant capital investments
regularly proceed on the basis of unsigned “deal memos” and draft
agreements with uncertain legal enforceability. These “soft contracts”
constitute a hybrid instrument adapted to the transactional hazards of
an environment in which neither formal contract nor reputation
effects can adequately specify and enforce parties’ commitments at
any reasonable cost. Uncertainly enforceable contracts embed an
implicit termination-and-renegotiation option that provides flexibility
to respond to changed circumstances while maintaining a threat of
legal liability that provides some transactional security. Evidence
collected from litigation records, trade-press coverage, and field
interviews shows that parties select “softer” or “harder” contractual
instruments following a marginal cost–benefit calculus that secures
parties’ commitments at the lowest transaction-cost burden. Observed
differences in the formalization levels selected with respect to different
stages, elements, and parties in a film production reflect underlying
differences in reputational capital, transactional experience,

Copyright © 2015 Jonathan M. Barnett.
† Professor, University of Southern California, Gould School of Law. I am grateful for
valuable suggestions from participants at workshops held at Columbia Law School, USC Gould
School of Law, and the 2012 Annual Conference of the International Society for New
Institutional Economics, as well as conversations and interviews with industry executives and
attorneys. I especially thank David Fierson for bringing this paper’s subject to my attention,
Professors Victor Goldberg and Mark Weinstein for valuable suggestions on prior drafts, and
Jonathan Handel for extensive discussions on industry practices. For excellent research
assistance, I thank Dmitri Gabrielov, Michael Hartman, Blake Horn, Minku Kang, Susanna
Kim, Omar Nourreldin, Vanessa Roman, and Lewis Stevenson. Comments are welcome at
jbarnett@law.usc.edu.

BARNETT IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

12/2/2014 10:34 PM

606

[Vol. 64:605

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

specification costs, enforcement costs, and holdup risk. A survey of
litigation records and trade-press coverage since the inception of the
Hollywood motion-picture industry suggests that soft contracts
emerged as a substitute for the long-term employment contracts that
secured studios’ and talent’s commitments in the era of the “studio
system.”
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“Aren’t you people ever going to come in front of me with a signed
1
contract?”

INTRODUCTION
2

The Hollywood motion-picture industry regularly enters into
significant commitments under various species of incomplete
agreements: oral communications, informal correspondence, deal
memoranda, and draft agreements that are negotiated throughout a
production and often remain unsigned. These unsigned deals—what I
call “soft contracts”—are supported by an uncertain threat of legal
enforcement coupled with some prospect of reputational liability.
Hollywood’s loose transactional practices challenge conventional
expectations that an enforceable contract is a precondition for any
significant financial undertaking. Business lawyers usually make
special efforts to protect clients (and themselves) by avoiding the
predicament of being potentially, but not certainly, subject to legal
liability. Hollywood departs from this prudent approach.

1. This statement was reportedly made by the presiding judge to Warner Bros.’ counsel in
litigation involving an alleged breach of oral contract by Rodney Dangerfield. See Joseph D.
Schleimer, Coppola Verdict’s Impact on Studio/Talent Talks, 16 ENT. L. & FIN., No. 6 (Sept.
1998), available at http://www.schleimerlaw.com/ELF998.htm.
2. By “Hollywood,” I refer throughout to the motion-picture (and, where specified, the
television) industry based in Southern California, including the major film studios and the
network of smaller entities that transact with those studios.
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Existing explanations attribute Hollywood’s contracting practices
to the creative proclivities of actors and other participants who have
3
little appreciation of legal matters. But these explanations are
incompatible with the competitive environment populated by the
sophisticated intermediaries who represent talent and their
counterparties in Hollywood. I account for Hollywood’s contracting
practices as an efficient adaptation to an environment characterized
by three salient features: high specification and enforcement costs,
significant but limited reputational pressures, and high holdup risk
and outcome uncertainty. These features drive parties to select
uncertainly enforceable soft contracts over two transactional
alternatives: more fully formalized and certainly enforceable
agreements (“hard” contracts) and less formalized and certainly
unenforceable agreements (“informal” contracts). Whereas hard
contracts are supported solely by the threat of legal liability and
informal contracts are supported solely by the threat of reputational
liability, a soft contract relies on a mix of legal and reputational
liability to constrain, but not entirely limit, deviations from prior
4
commitments.
This Article’s argument relies on a novel approach that treats
contractual formality as a deal term on the negotiating table. Just as
parties negotiate over the terms of a transaction, parties negotiate
5
over the type of instruments used to formalize those terms. This

3. See infra note 95 and accompanying text.
4. The concept of “soft contracts” draws on two foundational papers. The first is Victor P.
Goldberg, Toward an Expanded Theory of Contract, 10 J. ECON. ISSUES 45 (1976), which
analyzes the use of flexible contractual terms to structure the process of adjusting terms in
response to new information. The second is Benjamin Klein, Why Holdups Occur: The SelfEnforcing Range of Contractual Relationships, 34 ECON. INQUIRY 444 (1996), which analyzes
the interaction of reputational and legal enforcement in constraining holdup behavior. Other
scholars have addressed these issues in the context of innovation markets. See Iva Bozovic &
Gillian K. Hadfield, Scaffolding: Using Formal Contracts to Build Informal Relations to Support
Innovation (USC Law & Econ. Research Paper Series No. C12–3, 2012) (arguing that formal
contracts serve as scaffolding to the inherently informal enforcement of contractual relations);
Ronald J. Gilson, Charles F. Sabel & Robert E. Scott, Braiding: The Interaction of Formal and
Informal Contracting in Theory, Practice, and Doctrine, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1377, 1387–1402
(2010) (arguing that innovation markets break down the traditional balancing of formal- and
informal-contracting strategies).
5. As discussed below, other scholars have observed (as is well known to practitioners)
that parties sometimes intentionally agree upon ambiguous contract terms. See infra note 34. By
contrast, this Article concerns a strategy in which parties intentionally proceed pursuant to a
contract whose entire legal existence is ambiguous. For the closest contribution, see generally
Ricard Gil, The Interplay of Formal and Relational Contracts: Evidence from Movies, 29 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 681 (2011), which argues that distributors and exhibitors in the Spanish film
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contrasts with the traditional approach in contract scholarship, which
assumes (usually implicitly) the existence of a binding contract and
then proceeds to analyze the efficiency of the contract terms. The
level of formalization matters to transacting parties because it impacts
the likelihood of legal enforceability, which in turn acts as a proxy for
the flexibility of the parties’ commitments. Just as parties can achieve
any preferred level of transactional flexibility through explicit
contractual terms, they can do so indirectly by calibrating the level of
formalization used to memorialize those terms. Reducing
formalization reduces enforceability, which enhances flexibility by
embedding an implicit termination-and-renegotiation option that
enables a party to withdraw or adjust contract terms in response to
information that significantly raises that party’s cost of performance.
Increasing formalization increases enforceability, which reduces
flexibility by identifying a set of circumstances in which a
nonterminating party can credibly threaten legal action in response to
an announced or threatened withdrawal. So long as a soft contract
can at least mimic the level of flexibility that could be achieved
through a more formalized hard contract, the soft contract is the
preferred option, given that it achieves the same expected outcome
with lower transaction costs, resulting in a net expected gain.
I focus on a segment of the film industry where unsigned deals
are especially prevalent: transactions between studios or other
6
7
production entities and higher-value talent (mostly, actors and
8
directors), commonly known as “stars.” I collected evidence through
industry endogenously select the level of contractual formalization, resulting in a hybrid
contract consisting of a formal agreement modified by an informal commitment to renegotiate
in response to new information. Id. at 684.
6. As used in this Article, “studios” refers to either the small group of major studios that
have a full range of financing, distribution, and production capacities or the larger group of
independent production companies that have only production capacities and must seek
distribution and financing elsewhere, or that have limited in-house distribution and financing
capacities (a “mini–major” studio). Where necessary, I distinguish between these specific types
of entities.
7. Throughout I use the term “actor” to refer to both male and female performers.
8. Existing scholarship on the economics of contracts in the film industry has analyzed
contracts between distributors and theatrical exhibitors. See Arthur S. De Vany & W. David
Walls, Bose-Einstein Dynamics and Adaptive Contracting in the Motion Picture Industry, 106
ECON. J. 1493, 1493–1513 (1996) (modeling distributor–exhibitor agreements with regard to
information dynamics); Gil, supra note 5. Existing scholarship has also analyzed profit-sharing
provisions in talent contracts. See Darlene C. Chisholm, Asset Specificity and Long-Term
Contracts: The Case of the Motion Picture Industry, 19 E. ECON. J. 143, 143–55 (1993)
(evaluating changes in talent’s contracts in Hollywood from 1929 to 1948 with regard to asset
specificity and transaction-cost minimization); Victor P. Goldberg, The Net Profits Puzzle, 97
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field interviews with industry participants; a review of practitioner
commentary; a survey of over a century’s worth of legal disputes as
recorded in the digital archives of Daily Variety, the industry’s
authoritative trade publication; and the opinions and orders of federal
and state courts. That rich body of evidence supports two
propositions. First, soft contracts occupy an intermediate region of
expected enforceability, as compared to hard contracts (which are
certainly enforceable), and informal contracts (which are certainly
unenforceable). Second, studios and stars (or their representatives)
adjust formalization levels to secure parties’ commitments to a film
project at the lowest transaction-cost burden. In particular, parties
adjust formalization levels depending on the reputational capital and
transactional knowledge of their counterparties, the holdup risk at
any particular stage of a transaction, and the specification costs
required to formalize any particular element of a transaction. This
approach accounts for observed differences in formalization levels
within studio–star transactions, across the larger set of transactions in
the Hollywood film industry, and, preliminarily, in other markets that
employ a mix of more and less formalized contractual instruments.
Far from being imprudent, soft contracts efficiently secure and adjust
parties’ commitments in high-risk, high-stakes transactions governed
by significant but limited reputational pressures.
A complete explanation for soft contracting in Hollywood must
explain why studios and stars do not use a simpler mechanism to
secure parties’ commitments: namely, vertical integration. At a onetime fixed specification cost, the studio could bind talent to a longterm employment contract and shift all transactions from the
10
“market” to the “firm.” That would place both parties in a secure
transactional framework and significantly limit the risk and

COLUM. L. REV. 524, 524–50 (1997) (assessing the benefits of contingent-compensation
contracts to both studios and talent); Mark Weinstein, Profit-Sharing Contracts in Hollywood:
Evolution and Analysis, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 67, 67–112 (1998) (questioning principal–agent
explanations for profit-sharing contracts). There is a small practitioner literature on unsigned
deals in the film industry. See supra note 3.
9. The eight interviewees include three senior law-firm partners or counsel with
entertainment-law practices; four current or former in-house counsel, including two general
counsels, at two major Hollywood studios and one “mini–major” studio; and a former chief
executive at a major Hollywood studio. In addition, I conducted informal conversations with
other entertainment attorneys. Throughout, I use abbreviations to refer to the various
interviews I conducted with industry participants. For a full list and description of all interviews
and corresponding abbreviations, see infra App. D.
10. See Ronald Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937).
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uncertainty to which studio and talent are exposed throughout a film
production. Hollywood mostly operated under this arrangement
during the studio-system era that prevailed from the 1920s until its
erosion in the late 1940s. The dismantling of the studio system, and its
replacement by a disaggregated network of studios, talent agencies,
and independent production companies, necessitated alternative
arrangements by which to secure commitments from external
suppliers of talent and other inputs to a film production. The result is
the fluid mix of hard and soft-contracting practices observed in
Hollywood today.
This Article proceeds in six parts. In Part I, I describe the key
economic characteristics of a motion-picture project. In Part II, I
detail the key features of soft contracts and present data on the use
and enforceability of soft contracts in Hollywood from the early
twentieth century through the present. In Part III, I propose an
economic rationale for soft contracting. In Part IV, I apply that
rationale to account for observed tendencies in Hollywood
contracting practices. In Part V, I examine how soft contracting may
have displaced vertical integration as the primary transactional
structure for talent–studio relationships in Hollywood. In Part VI, I
discuss soft-contracting practices outside Hollywood and the
normative implications of this phenomenon for contract law in
general.
I. HOLLYWOOD ECONOMICS
Three features of the Hollywood film industry are especially
salient from an economic perspective: (1) the high stakes, extreme
risk, and contracting hazards of a film project; (2) the longevity and
dominance of a small group of major studios; and (3) the persistence
of the “star” vehicle in the labor market for acting and directorial
talent. As I explain below, the latter two features derive from the
first.
A. Why Only Fools Invest in Movies
Making a movie is far from an economically certain proposition,
for three principal reasons: the capital requirements tend to be high,
the odds of success are slim, and the contracting hazards are
formidable. These factors provide the basis for identifying the
economic rationale behind Hollywood’s peculiar contracting
practices.
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1. High Stakes and Extreme Uncertainty.
A substantial
investment is typically at stake in a motion-picture production. The
Motion Picture Association of America reported that in 2007, majorstudio films had average production and distribution costs of $106.6
11
million. Recent blockbuster films have had production and
distribution budgets as high as $410 million. For example, Disney’s
Pirates of the Caribbean: On Stranger Tides, which was released in
12
2011, reportedly incurred production costs of $410 million.
Compounding matters, any investor’s likelihood of earning a positive
return on a particular film is slim. A striking illustration of this risk is
John Carter, a major “flop” resulting in an estimated loss to Disney of
13
$200 million. Any movie is akin to a gamble with long odds: a few
hits succeed spectacularly, while the remainder consists of flops that
generate meager or no profits. This disparity in outcomes is dramatic.
Out of a sample of 2,015 movies released in the North American
market between 1984 and 1996, only 22 percent of releases were
profitable; and 6.3 percent of all the movies earned 80 percent of the
14
total profits. No known metric exists by which to predict the
15
likelihood of success or failure for a given film. This is sometimes
16
known as the “nobody knows” property.

11. Richard Verrier, MPAA Stops Disclosing Average Costs of Making and Marketing
Movies, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 1, 2009), http://articles.latimes.com/2009/apr/01/business/fi-cotownmpaa1. In industry terminology, “production and distribution cost” refers to both the “negative
cost,” the cost of production, and prints and ads, or “P&A,” which primarily includes the costs
of advertising and making prints for theatrical exhibition.
12. Christian Sylt, Fourth Pirates of the Caribbean Is Most Expensive Movie Ever with
Costs of $410 Million, FORBES (July 22, 2014, 4:28 PM), http://www.forbes.com/
sites/csylt/2014/07/22/fourth-pirates-of-the-caribbean-is-most-expensive-movie-ever-with-costsof-410-million.
13. Paul Bond, ‘John Carter’ Will Cost Disney $200 Million in Operating Losses,
HOLLYWOOD REP. (Mar. 19, 2012, 1:43 PM), http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/news/johncarter-cost-disney-millions-301704.
14. Arthur S. De Vany & W. David Walls, Motion Picture Profit, the Stable Paretian
Hypothesis, and the Curse of the Superstar, 28 J. ECON. DYNAMICS & CONTROL 1035, 1039–40
(2004). For this purpose, the authors defined “profit” to mean revenues minus capital, interest,
overhead, advertising, and other costs. Id. at 1039.
15. See ARTHUR S. DE VANY, HOLLYWOOD ECONOMICS: HOW EXTREME UNCERTAINTY
SHAPES THE FILM INDUSTRY 75–76, 84–89 (2004).
16. The phrase is derived from a statement by screenwriter William Goldwyn: “NOBODY
KNOWS ANYTHING. Not one person in the entire motion picture field knows for a certainty
what’s going to work.” WILLIAM GOLDWYN, ADVENTURES IN THE SCREEN TRADE: A
PERSONAL VIEW OF HOLLYWOOD AND SCREENWRITING 39 (1983).
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2. Holdup Risk. A film project proceeds along an extended
multiyear timeline starting with idea conception and running through
release at the box office. At various points, parties must make what
institutional economists call “specific” investments in the project—
that is, investments that have a lower value (or no value) in any
alternative use—before having any reliable information as to the
likely commercial outcome. Specific investments trigger exposure to
holdup behavior by counterparties, subject to reputational and legal
constraints. Once one party has made a sunk investment in the film
project, the non-investing party can extract value from the investing
party by refusing to perform its side of the bargain, subject to
renegotiation of the project’s terms to the non-investing party’s
17
advantage. This concept can be illustrated more concretely in the
entertainment context as follows. Assume a studio has started
production on a movie and has agreed by contract to compensate its
lead star with $1 million in cash and 5 percent of the gross box-office
revenues. After one month during which the studio has incurred
significant production costs, the lead star announces that he is
dissatisfied with the director’s performance and threatens to quit. In
negotiations, the star’s representative suggests that his client may
revise his opinion of the director’s performance if the star’s
compensation were increased to $1.5 million in cash and 10 percent of
the gross box-office revenues. Ignoring any potential effects on the
studio’s exposure to opportunistic renegotiation in future projects,
the studio will agree so long as its expected incremental costs of
obtaining the services of an equivalent-value star, including any delay
to the production schedule and associated losses, less any expected
amount recoverable through litigation against the talent (net of legal
fees), would exceed the additional compensation being demanded by
the star.
3. Multiple Inputs. A film project is transactionally complex,
which inflates its ex ante contracting costs and, in the event of breach,

17. See Benjamin Klein, Robert G. Crawford & Armen A. Alchian, Vertical Integration,
Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process, 21 J.L. & ECON. 297, 308 (1978)
(demonstrating how opportunistic postcontractual incentives to renegotiate based upon changes
in the automotive-parts industry led to vertical integration rather than reliance on long-term
contracts). See generally OLIVER WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND
ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS (1975) (describing how a non-investing party may span both sides of
a transaction and thus subordinate and pressure the other party into accepting renegotiated
terms).

BARNETT IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

12/2/2014 10:34 PM

614

[Vol. 64:605

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

ex post enforcement costs. The production entity must combine goods
and services supplied by hundreds of different entities and
individuals. The core inputs include (1) financing; (2) production;
(3) creative talent; (4) technical personnel; (5) pre-release marketing;
(6) theatrical exhibition; and (7) post-release distribution such as
home video, the internet, and television. These inputs can be
obtained either internally within a single firm or externally through
the market. As shown below, in Hollywood’s current industrial
structure, external market-based sourcing predominates and is
universally the case with respect to talent.
Figure 1. The Transactional Structure of a Hollywood Film Project
Financing Entities
* studio
* lenders
* investors

Production Entity
(studio or independent)

* actors
* writers
* directors

Distribution Entity
= External
Supply
= Internal
Supply

“Above-the-Line”
Labor

(studio)

Theatrical Exhibition

“Below-the-Line”
Labor
* craft personnel

Post-Theatrical
Distribution

B. Why Studios Exist: The Inevitability of Scale
Since the start of Hollywood, a small group of major studios has
held remarkably consistent market shares. In 2011, the six major
studios (Sony Pictures, 20th Century Fox, Walt Disney, Paramount,
Warner Bros., and Universal) accounted for 81.2 percent of gross
18
domestic box-office revenues; in 1939, five major studios and three
smaller studios released 85 percent of the feature films released that
19
year. The widespread belief that these high concentration levels can
be attributed to high entry barriers misses a more fundamental
20
point. The scale and scope of the Hollywood studio are means by
18. Ray Subers, Paramount Wins 2011 Studio Battle, BOX OFFICE MOJO (Jan. 11, 2012),
http://boxofficemojo.com/news/?id=3345.
19. See MAE D. HUETTING, ECONOMIC CONTROL OF THE MOTION PICTURE INDUSTRY: A
STUDY IN INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 84, 87 (1944).
20. See generally DEAN ALGER, HOW GIANT CORPORATIONS DOMINATE MASS MEDIA,
DISTORT COMPETITION, AND ENDANGER DEMOCRACY (1998) (suggesting that greater
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which to fund the high costs, and spread the high risks, of film
production. A Hollywood studio does not primarily “make movies”;
rather, it is primarily a vehicle for coordinating the inputs required to
assemble a film as well as for financing, marketing, and distributing
films produced by internal production divisions and independent
production entities. By holding a diversified portfolio of projects and
maintaining a library of past successes, the studio can generate a
sufficient number of “hits” and revenue streams to make up for losses
on the far greater number of “flops.” The importance of that
diversification function is illustrated by the fact that even critically
successful independent production companies face chronic financial
difficulties and often declare insolvency or are acquired by a major
21
studio.
C. Star Power
The star vehicle has been a consistent feature of the movie
22
industry over virtually its entire history. In 1919, the commercial
power of Charlie Chaplin, a star director and performer, was so great
that he founded his own production company, United Artists,
together with fellow stars Douglas Fairbanks, Mary Pickford, and
23
D.W. Griffith. The persistence of the star vehicle can be explained
through reference to two mechanisms. First, high-quality, low-cost
reproduction technologies create “winner-take-all” effects that
disproportionately drive market rents to the most highly valued
24
performers. Second, consumers mitigate consumption risk by using a
star as an imperfect indicator of movie quality, which drives
producers, distributors, and financiers to use that same variable as a

consideration should be given to the scale of big corporate media studios and the extent to
which they provide diversified information); BEN BAGDIKIAN, THE NEW MEDIA MONOPOLY
(2004) (same); LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: HOW BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY
AND THE LAW TO LOCK DOWN CULTURE AND CONTROL CREATIVITY (2004) (same).
21. See THOMAS D. SELZ, MELVIN SIMENSKY, PATRICIA ACTON & ROBERT LIND,
ENTERTAINMENT LAW: LEGAL CONCEPTS AND BUSINESS PRACTICES §§ 1.8, 2.3 (3d ed. 2009);
Barbara Boyle, The Independent Spirit, in THE MOVIE BUSINESS BOOK 176 (Jason Squire ed.,
3d ed. 2004).
22. See Gorham Kindem, Hollywood’s Movie Star System: A Historical Overview, in THE
AMERICAN MOVIE INDUSTRY: THE BUSINESS OF MOTION PICTURES 79–93 (Gorham Kindem
ed., 1982) (tracing the role of the Hollywood star from the 1910s to the 1970s).
23. 1 TINO BALIO, UNITED ARTISTS, 1919-1950: THE COMPANY BUILT BY THE STARS 12–
13 (2009).
24. See Sherwin Rosen, The Economics of Superstars, 71 AM. ECON. REV. 845, 845–58
(1981) (modeling talent in the context of income distribution).
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proxy for a film’s likelihood of success. Both factors explain why
major feature films typically cannot be financed without a “bankable”
star cast or director, and why industry participants closely follow
26
rankings of star value. Actors and directors in the upper echelon of
those rankings represent a scarce asset for which studios compete
vigorously, while all others are virtually a commodity good. The
Bureau of Labor Statistics estimates that, in 2010, of the nearly one
hundred thousand members of the Screen Actors Guild (the actors’
union), only about fifty earned extraordinarily high incomes, while
most others earned meager salaries and were unemployed for long
27
periods of time. Other evidence confirms this extreme disparity in
talent’s fortunes. For the period from 1993 to 1995, only fifty-eight
directors directed more than one feature film released by a major
28
studio, and only three directors directed at least three such films; for
that same period, 79.5 percent of all actors who acted in any film
29
acted in only one film; and, for the period from 1995 to 2001, only

25. The extent to which the presence of a star improves the likelihood of a successful
release remains unresolved. Using a sample of two thousand films released from 1984 to 1996,
an empirical study finds that, on average, a star significantly increases the least revenue a movie
may earn (that is, a star constrains the lower tail portion of the revenue distribution) and slightly
increases a movie’s chance of making a profit, in each case relative to a movie without a star. See
DE VANY, supra note 15, at 87–88. This is consistent with findings that actors positively impact
opening performance. Anita Elberse, The Power of Stars: Do Star Actors Drive the Success of
Movies?, 71 J. MARKETING 102, 118 (2007).
26. Recently released rankings include the “Ulmer Scale,” a list of the industry’s top 1400
actors ranked by “bankability,” or the ability to raise “100% or majority financing” for a movie,
Ulmer Scale: Welcome, THE ULMER SCALE, http://www.ulmerscale.com/aboutUS.html (last
visited Nov. 18, 2014), the Internet Movie Database’s “StarMeter” list, based on the search
behavior of users of the “IMDb.com” website, a leading online source of information in the film
industry, Year in Review—STARmeter Top 10 of 2011, IMDb, http://www.imdb.com/
oscars/year-in-review/starmeter-top-10-of-2011 (last updated June 13, 2013), Esquire’s “Box
Office Power” list, based on box-office revenues, as weighted by various criteria, Matthew
Shepatin, Who’s the Most Bankable Star in Hollywood?, ESQUIRE (May 27, 2008, 8:27 AM),
http://www.esquire.com/the-side/feature/box-office-power-052308, and Forbes’ “Star Currency”
list, based on industry surveys, Star Currency Celebrity Rankings, FORBES,
http://www.forbes.com/starcurrency (last visited Nov. 18, 2014).
27. U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR & STATISTICS, OCCUPATIONAL OUTLOOK
HANDBOOK 2010-11 LIBRARY EDITION, at 320 (Jan. 2010), available at http://en.calameo
.com/read/000763400c8731e6cfd86.
28. Ezra Zuckerman, Do Firms and Markets Look Different? Repeat Collaboration in the
Motion Picture Industry, 1935-1995, at 9 (MIT Sloan School of Management, Working Paper,
2004). The three directors referred to above are John Badham, Oliver Stone, and Joel
Schumacher. Id.
29. Id. at 10.
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thirty-six actors appeared in two or more hit films (defined as a film
30
that grossed $100 million or more).
II. HOLLYWOOD CONTRACTING
Scholars have observed—and business lawyers would not be
surprised to learn—that parties use strategic ambiguity in drafting
31
contracts. Other scholars have identified settings in which parties
32
appear to deliberately use legally unenforceable documentation,
entering into preliminary agreements that set forth some, but not all,
33
of the terms of a proposed transaction. But scholars have not yet
recognized that parties are sometimes strategic about whether they
34
are creating an enforceable contract. Standard business-law practice
35
is to take special care to avoid this predicament. Certainly, operating
in a gray area of potentially enforceable agreements may appear to be

30. DE VANY, supra note 15, at 243–45.
31. See Albert Choi & George Triantis, Strategic Vagueness in Contract Design: The Case
of Corporate Acquisitions, 119 YALE L.J. 848, 848–924 (2010) (explaining the benefits of vague
language in acquisition contracts); George S. Geis, An Embedded Options Theory of Indefinite
Contracts, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1664, 1664–1719 (2006) (explaining the strategic use of vague
language in contracts generally).
32. See Arnoud W.A. Boot, Stuart I. Greenbaum & Anjan V. Thakor, Reputation and
Discretion in Financial Contracting, 83 AM. ECON. REV. 1165, 1165–83 (1993) (describing the
effects of discretionary contracts on reputational capital); David Charny, Nonlegal Sanctions in
Commercial Relationships, 104 HARV. L. REV. 373, 373–467 (1990) (analyzing parties’ reliance
on nonlegal sanctions to enforce agreements); Victor P. Goldberg, Lawyers Asleep at the Wheel?
The GM-Fisher Body Contract, 17 INDUS. & CORP. CHANGE 1071, 1071–84 (2008) (evaluating
one instance of intentional use of non–legally enforceable contracting); Friedrich Kessler,
Automobile Dealer Franchises: Vertical Integration by Contract, 66 YALE L.J. 1135, 1135–90
(1957) (describing the invalidation of franchise contracts due to indefiniteness); Stewart
Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM. SOC. REV. 55,
55–67 (1963) (detailing the success of non–legally enforceable arrangements in manufacturing);
Ronald Mann, The Role of Letters of Credit in Payment Transactions, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2494,
2494–2536 (2000) (describing unenforceable credit agreements); Robert E. Scott, A Theory of
Self-Enforcing Indefinite Agreements, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1641, 1641–96 (2003) (identifying
reciprocal fairness as a source of indefinite agreements).
33. See Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Precontractual Liability and Preliminary
Agreements, 120 HARV. L. REV. 661, 661–707 (2007) (providing a model to explain preliminary
agreements, their breach, and errors in court enforcement); Omri Ben-Shahar, “Agreeing to
Disagree”: Filling Gaps in Deliberately Incomplete Contracts, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 389, 389–428
(2004) (proposing partial enforcement for partially definite contracts).
34. The possibility that parties may deliberately choose ambiguous levels of legal
enforceability is mentioned in passing in Scott, supra note 32, at 1685 n.172.
35. See Joseph M. Perillo, UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts:
The Black Letter Text and a Review, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 281, 287 (1994) (“Within the
common law system, most legal professionals . . . staunchly cling to the supreme value of
certainty of result.”).
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imprudent for both client and attorney. Yet Hollywood appears to
feel otherwise.
A. Conventional Contracting
The timeline of a conventional transaction is depicted below.
First, after some initial discussion, the parties enter into a preliminary
agreement, often called a “memorandum of understanding” or “letter
of intent,” which describes the basic terms of the proposed
36
transaction and usually states that the document is nonbinding.
Negotiation of detailed terms and legal and financial diligence then
proceeds simultaneously. If the process advances sufficiently, the
parties negotiate, draft, and execute a package of final agreements,
and finally close the deal (in a discrete transaction) or undertake
other forms of performance (in a “relationship” transaction). In this
conventional sequence, there is a clear demarcation between the
negotiation period, in which there is no risk of contractual liability,
and the performance period, in which there is clear contractual
liability. Once the deal is executed, the parties commence
performance under the assurance that all subsequent investments are
governed by contractual terms that can be enforced in court.
Figure 2. The Conventional Deal
Negotiation

No Deal
Negotiation

Letter of Intent with
Nonbinding Disclaimer

Agreement
Signed

Closing
(performance)

B. Hollywood Contracting
The high risk of commercial failure, combined with the holdup
risk inherent in sequential investment and the disaggregated structure
of the film industry, accounts for what the Hollywood press calls the

36. Exceptions to the “no liability” disclaimers are sometimes made with respect to
confidentiality provisions or, in an acquisition transaction, “no shop” provisions barring the
target firm from seeking bids from other acquirers. For further discussion, see RALPH B. LAKE
& UGO DRAETTA, LETTERS OF INTENT AND OTHER PRECONTRACTUAL DOCUMENTS:
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS AND FORMS 15–16 (2d ed. Supp. 1996) (discussing enforcement of,
and good-faith obligations in, agreements to negotiate).
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37

“waiting game.” The studio or outside investor is not willing to
commit to a project until the star is signed up, the star is not willing to
commit until the investor is signed up, and the distributor is not
38
willing to commit until both the star and investor are signed up. To
partially address this problem, Hollywood has developed a rich menu
of time-limited option contracts that condition performance
39
obligations on the occurrence of specified triggering events. For
example, a studio typically acquires a screenplay from a writer in
exchange for an initial acquisition fee and the option to purchase the
40
screenplay for an additional fee within a certain period. In certain
transactions, however, Hollywood does business differently. Rather
than conditioning performance on the execution of a contract, or
breaking up performance into stages on the basis of conditions
precedent, the parties use what appears to be a cruder device. Talent
and studios, among others, often commence performance under
imperfectly specified obligations set forth in a mix of oral
communications, email exchanges, letters, and unsigned draft
contracts. In these unsigned deals, it is unclear when legal liability
commences or ends.
1. The Unsigned Deal. The typical sequence of an unsigned deal
between a studio and a star actor is depicted below. A Daily Variety
article summarizes this sequence: First, an actor’s agent or attorney
makes an oral agreement with the studio. Next, the parties exchange
a deal memo. Then “reams of paperwork” (meaning, draft long-form
agreements) are exchanged. Finally, in rare cases, the long-form
41
agreement is finalized and signed. The deal memo, which is often or
42
usually left unexecuted, typically sets forth key terms such as the
37. See, e.g., Kevin Jagernauth, Will the Waiting Game for J.J. Abrams Cause “Star Trek 2”
to Move From Summer to Winter 2012?, INDIEWIRE (May 24, 2011, 11:22 AM), http://blogs
.indiewire.com/theplaylist/archives/will_the_waiting_game_for_j.j._abrams_cause_star_trek_2_t
o_move_from.
38. See ALEXANDRA BROUWER & THOMAS LEE WRIGHT, WORKING IN HOLLYWOOD 50
(1990) (noting that studios are wary of committing to a movie until the talent package has been
fully assembled); BASTIAN CLEVÉ, FILM PRODUCTION MANAGEMENT 108 (2d ed. 2000)
(explaining that producers wait as long as possible to enter into contracts that “lock them into
fixed starting dates”).
39. For a full review, see generally SCHUYLER M. MOORE, THE BIZ: THE BASIC BUSINESS,
LEGAL AND FINANCIAL ASPECTS OF THE FILM INDUSTRY (4th ed. 2011).
40. Id. at 199–200.
41. See Double Trouble Irks Legal Eagles, DAILY VARIETY, July 14, 1997.
42. According to three interviewees, the deal memo is typically not signed. Telephone
Interview with Entm’t Attorney I, in L.A., Cal. (May 31, 2011); Telephone Interview with
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fixed compensation (and, in some cases, a “pay-or-play” commitment
guaranteeing payment even if talent’s services are not used); the
43
actor’s role; screen credit; and, in summary form, the talent’s
44
contingent compensation based on the film’s performance. Before
the start of shooting, studios generally insist that talent execute a
“certificate of engagement” assigning to the studio all intellectual45
property rights in talent’s contribution to the project. As shown
below, three outcomes may result: the contract is executed during
46
shooting; the contract is executed after shooting has been
47
completed; or the contract is continuously negotiated—becoming a
48
so-called “creeping contract” —but is never executed, remaining in
49
draft form.

Entm’t Attorney III, in L.A., Cal. (Apr. 9, 2013); Interview with Studio Exec., in L.A., Cal.
(Apr. 16, 2013).
43. This refers to the manner in which the talent’s role will be reflected in the “credits,”
including credits that appear in the motion picture and credits that appear in promotional
materials. Parties contract over the prominence of the credit—in particular, placement and font
size. See RICHARD CAVES, CREATIVE INDUSTRIES: CONTRACTS BETWEEN ART AND
COMMERCE 126–27 (2000)
44. For further discussion, see infra notes 145–48 and accompanying text.
45. Interview with Studio Counsel II, in L.A., Cal. (Mar. 2013); Telephone Interview with
Studio Counsel III, in L.A. Cal. (Aug. 29, 2011); Telephone Interview with Entm’t Attorney I,
supra note 42.
46. See Telephone Interview with Entm’t Attorney III, supra note 42 (providing examples
of a talent contract being executed at shooting); Telephone Interview with Studio Counsel III,
supra note 45 (same).
47. See Harrison J. Dossick, Resolving Disputes over Oral and Unsigned Film Agreements,
L.A. LAWYER, Apr. 1999; Telephone Interview with Entm’t Attorney I, supra note 42.
48. See Dossick, supra note 47.
49. See Telephone Interview with Studio Counsel I, in L.A., Cal. (Feb. 8, 2011); Interview
with Mini–Major Studio Counsel, in L.A., Cal. (Feb. 2011); Telephone Interview with Entm’t
Attorney III, supra note 42.
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Figure 3. The “Unsigned Deal”
Agreement signed
During Shooting
Negotiation

Negotiation

Agreement Signed
After Shooting
Shooting
Commences

Unsigned “Deal Memo”

Agreement Never
Signed

(or other short-form document)

Certificate of Engagement

2. Evidence on Soft-Contracting Practices in General. To
understand more precisely the extent to which soft-contracting
practices are used in the film industry, I undertook four types of
empirical inquiry: (1) I comprehensively surveyed the relevant
practitioner literature; (2) I conducted interviews with different types
50
of legal and business practitioners in the field; (3) I reviewed all of
the digital archives of Daily Variety, one of the industry’s two leading
trade journals, dating from the start of the film industry to the
51
present; and (4) I comprehensively surveyed the relevant litigation
in all federal courts, California state courts, and New York state
courts. All of these sources confirmed my general impression that
unsigned deals are common throughout the industry. Such unsigned
52
agreements include deals between studios and talent; studios and
53
individual producers; independent production companies and
54
studio–distributors; independent production companies and foreign

50. For all information on interviews, see infra App. D.
51. The other leading trade journal is The Hollywood Reporter. I relied primarily on Daily
Variety because it provides online access to all of its prior publications through a subscriptionbased digital archive.
52. See Telephone Interview with Entm’t Attorney II, in L.A., Cal. (June 2, 2011);
Interview with Studio Counsel II, supra note 45; Interview with Studio Exec., supra note 42;
Telephone Interview with Entm’t Attorney III, supra note 42; Interview with Mini–Major
Studio Counsel, supra note 49.
53. See Linda Rapportoni, Former Uni ‘Deal-Maker’ Testifies in ‘Pirates’ Trial, DAILY
VARIETY, June 6, 1991; Telephone Interview with Entm’t Attorney III, supra note 42.
54. See JOHN W. CONES, THE FEATURE FILM DISTRIBUTION DEAL 35 (1997) (providing
an example of a deal between an independent production company and a studio-distributor);
Telephone Interview with Entm’t Attorney II, supra note 52.
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56

57

distributors; talent and agents; talent and managers; and
58
entertainment companies and merchandisers. In a brief filed by the
major studio Warner Bros. in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit, the studio asserted that “many business deals are never
formalized” in the entertainment industry and that it is “standard” for
59
parties to commence performance without a formalized contract.
Consistent with these assertions, a Los Angeles County Superior
Court judge observed that “[m]otion picture development and
production operates in a unique business universe . . . . Multi-million
dollar film projects are developed and completed (or cancelled) on
the basis of loose, artistic understandings without written, signed
60
contracts.”
3. Evidence on Deals Between Studios and Stars. Unsigned deals
are most consistently used in the case of talent–studio transactions
61
and, in particular, in deals involving higher-value talent (or “stars”).
I therefore chose to focus on that segment in conducting a more
detailed empirical inquiry. Consistent with evidence produced in
62
litigation, interviewees reported that talent–studio agreements are

55. See Coudert Bros. LLP, Industry Custom & Practice: The Important [sic] of Arbitration
Clauses in International Entertainment Contracts, FINDLAW.COM (Mar. 26, 2008), http://
library.findlaw.com/1998/Jan/1/126624.html (providing an overview of the deal-making process
between domestic production companies and foreign distributors).
56. See Telephone Interview with Entm’t Attorney I, supra note 42.
57. See Ricardo Cestero, Managers vs. Talent, or When BFFs Turn Nasty, L. L. LAND
(Apr. 28, 2010), http://www.lawlawlandblog.com/2010/04/managers_vs_talent_or_when_bff.html
(discussing the recent rise in legal disputes between managers and talent).
58. See PMC, Inc. v. Saban Entm’t, Inc., 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d 877, 880 (Ct. App. 1996) (suit
brought by a manufacturer against the holder of “The Mighty Morphin Power Rangers”
copyright over disputed licensing agreement).
59. Principal and Response Brief of Cross-Appellants and Appellees Warner Bros.
Entertainment Inc. and DC Comics at 3, 28, Larson v. Warner Bros., 504 F. App’x 586 (2012)
(Nos. 11-5863, 11-56034).
60. See Coppola v. Warner Bros., Inc., No. B126903 at 10–11 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 26, 2001),
available at http://www.schleimerlaw.com/CourtAppealCoppola.htm (concerning a contract
dispute between director Francis Ford Coppola and Warner Bros.).
61. See Stephen M. Kravit, Business Affairs, in THE MOVIE BUSINESS BOOK 197 (Jason
Squire ed., 3d ed. 2004); Telephone Interview with Entm’t Attorney III, supra note 42;
Telephone Interview with Studio Counsel I, supra note 49; Telephone Interview with Studio
Counsel III, supra note 45; Interview with Studio Exec., supra note 42.
62. In a suit between then-star Kim Basinger and an independent production company, the
court found that Basinger had acted in all but two of her previous nine films without a signed
contract. See Main Line Pictures, Inc. v. Basinger, No. B077509, 1994 WL 814244, at *2 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1994). The court observed that “film industry contracts are frequently oral agreements
based on unsigned ‘deal memos.’” Id. Likewise, in a suit between Francis Ford Coppola and
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often not memorialized in fully negotiated long-form documentation
and, for part or all of the transactional timeline, proceed on the basis
of some combination of incompletely formalized instruments: oral
63
64
65
commitments, deal memos, draft long-form agreements or letters,
66
email exchanges, and other informal communication.
Different studios and law firms appear to follow slightly different
variations of this practice, which in turn could be adjusted to serve the
needs of a particular project. In-house counsel reported that the
studio will typically “green light” a project based on incompletely
specified communications with talent attorneys and a mutual
understanding to subsequently negotiate and draft a fully executed
67
long-form agreement. A studio executive reported that the studio
sometimes commences shooting without a signed agreement but
identifies, in its comments to outstanding drafts, the points that it
68
considers to be unresolved. In other cases, studio lawyers send a
“reliance letter” indicating that an agreement had been reached
based on the last negotiation draft (and that the negotiator’s client is
relying on that belief), which may in turn prompt a “counter-reliance
69
letter” from the talent’s attorney. In the atypical case of a successful
release, these dueling drafts can even play a role in postproduction
accounting disputes over contingent-compensation provisions (known

Warner Bros., the court found that Coppola, a world-famous director, had not entered into a
signed contract in directing two previous films for the studio. Coppola, supra note 60.
63. See Telephone Interview with Entm’t Attorney II, supra note 52; Interview with Studio
Exec., supra note 42. This is consistent with the views expressed in Michael S. Bogner, Note,
The Problem with Handshakes: An Evaluation of Oral Agreements in the United States Film
Industry, 28 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 359, 363 (2004).
64. See Telephone Interview with Entm’t Attorney III, supra note 42.
65. See Interview with Studio Exec., supra note 42.
66. For further discussion, see DONALD E. BIEDERMAN ET AL., LAW AND BUSINESS OF
THE ENTERTAINMENT INDUSTRIES § 2.4 (4th ed. 2006); MARK LITWAK, REEL POWER: THE
STRUGGLE FOR INFLUENCE AND SUCCESS IN THE NEW HOLLYWOOD 160–61 (1994). Another
interviewee described the process in more detail: The talent attorney initially agrees on a deal
with the studio’s “business affairs” department, which sends a deal memo to the agent (without
requesting a signature) and the studio’s legal-affairs department. The legal-affairs department is
then instructed to “work out” a long-form agreement with the talent’s attorney. Telephone
Interview with Entm’t Attorney I, supra note 42. For similar accounts, see Interview with Mini–
Major Studio Counsel, supra note 49; Telephone Interview with Studio Counsel I, supra note 49;
Interview with Studio Counsel II, supra note 45; Telephone Interview with Studio Counsel III,
supra note 45; Telephone Interview with Entm’t Attorney II, supra note 52; Telephone
Interview with Entm’t Attorney III, supra note 42; Interview with Studio Exec., supra note 42.
67. See Telephone Interview with Studio Counsel III, supra note 45.
68. See id.; Telephone Interview with Entm’t Attorney I, supra note 42.
69. See Dossick, supra note 47.
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in the industry as “participation rights”); in fact, a cottage industry of
70
auditing firms reportedly specializes in this practice. Though the
level of formalization used differs among different projects and
different studios, it is clear that Hollywood studios and stars regularly
enter into commercially significant undertakings in the absence of a
fully formalized set of agreements.
C. Are Soft Contracts Legally Enforceable?
Do Hollywood’s soft contracts give rise to a meaningful threat of
legal liability? In a word, yes. As a matter of California and New
York law (the two most relevant jurisdictions for the American
entertainment industry), unsigned deals give rise to some prospect of
contractual or other liability. As compared to a fully specified and
executed long-form document, however, these forms of agreement
impose liability with reduced certainty.
1. The Indefiniteness Doctrine.
Because Hollywood’s soft
contracts are often characterized by incomplete levels of specificity, it
is important to understand the extent to which courts will enforce a
contract that does not explicitly set forth all terms. Historically, courts
71
have required mutual agreement over all essential terms. On that
basis, courts sometimes declined to enforce “agreements to agree” or
72
other preliminary or incompletely specified agreements. Current law
is more equivocal. Courts are sometimes willing to “fill in gaps” based
on a reasonableness criterion, which restores contractual
73
completeness and can potentially support a damages award. Far less

70. Discussion with Accountant Specializing in the Entertainment Industry, L.A., Cal.
(Sept. 2011). The absence of a signed agreement sometimes leads to litigation concerning the
calculation of “net profit” compensation—that is, the portion of the “net profits” owing to
talent after the studio has recovered its “costs” relating to the motion picture, in each case as the
relevant term is defined in relevant documentation exchanged between the parties—or to
litigation concerning other related issues. See, e.g., Hermit’s Glen Prods. Inc. v. Twentieth
Century Fox Film Corp., No. BC147241, 1997 WL 302292 (L.A. Sup. Ct. 1997) (concerning a
lawsuit filed by the writer–producer of the film White Men Can’t Jump, against a studio, over an
alleged breach of an oral agreement entitling him to a percentage of the film’s gross receipts).
71. See Ian Ayres, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default
Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 106 (1999) (referring to “the common law rule that indefinite contracts
are not enforceable”).
72. E. Allan Farnsworth, Precontractual Liability and Preliminary Agreements: Fair
Dealing and Failed Negotiations, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 217, 221 (1987).
73. For the most comprehensive empirical account of existing case law, see Scott, supra
note 32.
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frequently, courts may imply an agreement to negotiate in good faith
or, even without sufficient mutuality, may award reduced damages on
75
equitable grounds such as promissory estoppel or unjust enrichment.
Sophisticated parties can eliminate exposure to precontractual and
extracontractual liability by stating up front that any preliminary
communications are nonbinding. This simple prophylactic is standard
76
practice in other business settings and proves effective when tested
77
in court. But this simple precaution is apparently not consistently
undertaken in talent–studio transactions—as illustrated by talent–
studio disputes over the existence of a binding agreement, a question
that would be moot in the presence of such a disclaimer. Effectively,
entertainment lawyers are choosing not to fully opt out of a legal
regime that can impose liability by the unpredictable fiat of a judge or
jury.
2. The Writing Requirement. Because Hollywood’s soft contracts
are often communicated at least partly in oral form, it is important to
understand the extent to which courts will enforce oral agreements.
Under the common law, oral agreements are enforceable so long as
they satisfy the consideration and mutuality requirements that are
always a precondition for contractual enforceability. State and federal
statutes of frauds may also impose an additional writing requirement.
In California and New York, any contract that cannot be performed
within one year of its “making” must be in writing and executed by

74. See SIGA Techs., Inc. v. PharmaAthene, Inc., 67 A.3d 330, 351–52 (Del. 2013)
(establishing a right to seek damages for certain breaches of an agreement to negotiate in good
faith); Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass’n of Am. v. Tribune Co., 670 F. Supp. 491, 498–99
(S.D.N.Y. 1987) (same).
75. For the classic example of promissory estoppel as a ground for extracontractual
damages, see Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, Inc., 133 N.W.2d 267, 276–77 (Wis. 1965). For an
example of an award of damages under the quasi-contractual theory of unjust enrichment when
the underlying verbal contract was unenforceable under the applicable statute of frauds, see
Earhart v. William Low Co., 25 Cal.3d 503, 514 (1979).
76. LAKE, supra note 36, at 65; see Jason Scott Johnston, Communication and Courtship:
Cheap Talk Economics and the Law of Contract Formation, 85 VA. L. REV. 385, 404, 478 (1999)
(describing American courts’ reliance on the parties’ express disclaimers in such precontractual
instruments).
77. See Rennick HHC v. O.P.T.I.O.N. Care, Inc., 77 F.3d 309, 317–18 (9th Cir. 1996)
(declining to enforce a “handshake” deal because other written communications included
disclaimers of any legal liability before execution of a final written agreement); see also R.G.
Grp., Inc. v. Horn & Hardart, Co., 751 F.2d 69, 74 (Cal. 1984) (refusing to enforce an agreement
that included all material terms because it stated that the parties did not intend any legal
liability until the execution of a complete written agreement).
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the party against whom enforcement is sought. A writing is useful to
a studio-plaintiff under California law, which provides that, in
personal-services contracts, negative injunctive relief—that is, an
order preventing the talent-defendant from working for another
employer during the term of the agreement in dispute—is available
79
only if the writing requirement is satisfied. The federal copyright
statute provides that any exclusive transfer of a copyright interest
80
81
must be in writing, broadly defined, to be valid. Curiously, studios
and stars—who are all represented by sophisticated parties—
nonetheless enter into incompletely formalized agreements that
forfeit or endanger these legal advantages.
D. Are Soft Contracts Practically Enforceable?
This Section considers the extent to which soft contracts are
likely to give rise to legal liability as a practical matter. As discussed
below, soft contracts occupy an intermediate region between clearly
enforceable and clearly unenforceable promissory communications.
Without some reasonable anticipation of being held enforceable, soft
contracts would exert no deterrent force, hold no settlement value for
a potential plaintiff, impose few if any dispute-resolution costs on a
potential defendant, and largely overlap with certainly unenforceable
reputational agreements. Without some reasonable anticipation of
not being held enforceable, soft contracts would largely overlap with
certainly enforceable formal agreements.
1. Litigation Behavior: Case Law and Trade-Press Survey. To
gain insight into litigation behavior, I surveyed the digital archives of
78. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1624(a)(1) (West 2014); N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. L. § 5-701 (McKinney
2014).
79. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3423 (West 2014).
80. The Ninth Circuit has stated that, for purposes of 17 U.S.C. § 204(a) (2012), the writing
can be “a one-line pro forma statement.” Effects Assoc. Inc. v. Cohen, 908 F.2d 555, 557 (9th
Cir. 1999). Additionally, the writing need not contain any particular language. Radio-Television
Espanola S.A. v. New World Entm’t, Ltd., 183 F.3d 922, 927 (9th Cir. 1999). Finally, the writing
can even be executed after the alleged transfer. Magnuson v. Video Yesteryear, 85 F.3d 1424,
1429 (9th Cir. 1996).
81. 17 U.S.C. § 204(a). This explains why, in transactions that are otherwise
undocumented, the studio obtains a certificate of engagement from an actor or director even if
the long-form agreement remains unsigned. The certificate of engagement transfers to the
studio all copyright and other intellectual-property interests that talent may have in the motion
picture or any derivative works. For further discussion, see Part IV.C.2.a. Interviewees reported
that studios regularly insist on signing a definitive agreement with a screenwriter, perhaps due
to the lack of any ambiguity over whether the screenwriter’s contribution may be copyrighted.
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Daily Variety and the Westlaw and Lexis-Nexis case-law databases for
reports of contract-formation disputes between a studio and talent
(meaning an actor, director, or writer) involving an actual or
82
proposed film project. I identified a total of sixty-nine reported
“unsigned deal” disputes from the inception of the Hollywood film
industry through the present, all of which involved some formal legal
action. All but two arose after the end of the studio system, which this
Article dates to the year 1947. From 1947 through July 2014, there has
been on average slightly more than one reported talent–studio lawsuit
per year concerning contract formation. Although both the total
number of informal disputes and the total number of actual and
proposed film projects are unknown, it can be safely asserted that
studio and talent bear some meaningful legal exposure as a result of
terminating involvement in a project with respect to which the parties
have expressed a sufficiently firm commitment.
2. Litigation Outcomes: Case-Law Survey. I used the Lexis-Nexis
and Westlaw case-law databases to identify reported decisions
involving disputes between talent and a studio or other production
entity concerning the enforceability of oral agreements, deal
memoranda, draft agreements, and other incompletely specified or
83
unexecuted agreements relating to a film or television project. I
surveyed the entire period from the date of each database’s
84
inception through July 2014 in all federal courts and all New York
and California state courts. Additionally, I surveyed the period from
85
January 1980 to July 2014 for all other state courts. Appendix A
82. For this purpose, I targeted disputes over the existence of a legally binding agreement
between studio and talent, but excluded disputes with respect to a particular term of an
agreement that the parties otherwise recognized as having been duly formed.
83. I included cases relating to the television industry in this survey on the assumption that
judicial rulings concerning unsigned deals in television would influence expectations of parties
transacting with respect to a film project. I excluded cases involving “idea submission” disputes,
usually involving claims by a writer or producer that a network, studio or other production
company used an idea that had been pitched to the network or studio. See infra App. A for
further description of the data-inclusion criteria and sources.
84. The relevant Lexis-Nexis and Westlaw databases used in this search cover federal, New
York and California law from the date on which each respective jurisdiction was established. As
a practical matter, the search could obviously have located only cases decided since the start of
the commercial film industry in the United States. The first commercial motion-picture
exhibition in the United States took place in 1894 (the Edison Vitascope projection system).
See DOUGLAS GOMERY, SHARED PLEASURES: A HISTORY OF MOVIE PRESENTATION IN THE
UNITED STATES 7 (1992).
85. For purposes of surveying other state courts’ decisions, I selected a shorter time period
for reasons of manageability. On a separate point, it would be useful to learn whether any such
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provides a complete list of all identified cases, a summary of relevant
facts and holdings, and sources used.
a. Results. Not surprisingly, fully litigated cases rarely occur in
this context. I have identified only thirty-nine such decisions for the
entire period from the earliest reported decisions through July 2014
(all but two of which were issued after 1947). Of the thirty-nine cases,
the courts declined to recognize a valid contract in twenty-eight—that
is, almost 72 percent of the time, the court found that no contract
existed. Assuming that more fully specified or more completely
executed agreements are substantially more likely to be enforced, and
less fully specified or less completely executed agreements are
substantially less likely to be enforced, a soft contract represents a
meaningful transactional alternative between the options of a purely
86
formal or purely informal contract. The distribution of outcomes,
and underlying grounds for nonenforcement, are summarized in
Table 1 below:

disputes are resolved by arbitration, which is currently the typical dispute-resolution procedure
in Hollywood. I doubt, however, whether this would convey significant additional information.
First, my trade-press review identified only a single reported contract-formation dispute
between studio and talent that was resolved by arbitration. See App. A. Second, it is not clear
that arbitration is typically available in contract-formation disputes between studio and talent.
The “Basic Agreement,” which governs relationships between talent and any production entity
that is a signatory to the collective-bargaining agreement with the Screen Actors Guild
(formerly “SAG,” which is now known as “SAG-AFTRA”), subjects all disputes between those
parties to mandatory arbitration and, in the case of performers who earn below a certain
amount, identifies criteria by which to determine when a performer is deemed to be “definitely
engaged” with a production. These largely follow the mutual-assent requirements of the
common law of contract except that the Agreement provides that a binding contract is deemed
to have been made if a producer delivers an unsigned contract to the performer and the
performer executes it and returns it by the next business day. See PRODUCER-SCREEN ACTORS
GUILD CODIFIED BASIC AGREEMENT OF 2005, at 243 (2005), available at
http://www.sagaftra.org/files/sag/2005TheatricalAgreement.pdf. In the case of a document that
is signed by neither party, it is not clear that this Agreement would apply. With respect to
performers earning larger amounts, the Basic Agreement is silent on contract-formation
disputes.
86. This assumes that plaintiffs’ success rates with respect to contract-formation issues in
breach-of-contract litigation involving fully executed agreements are significantly greater than
28 percent. That seems a reasonable assumption in any well-functioning system of contract law.
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Table 1. Final Judicial Determinations Concerning the Enforceability
of “Soft Contracts” in Film and Television Projects (through July
87
2014)
Grounds for Nonenforcement

Outcome

Total

Oral
Agmt
Only

Enforce

11

8

Not
Enforce

28

13

State
Stat. of
Frauds

3

Federal
Stat. of
Frauds

Indefiniteness

Lack of
Intent to
be Bound

Other

6

13

5

4

b. Evaluation. Considered in the aggregate, the data collected on
litigation activity and outcomes support the view that parties engaged
in soft-contracting relationships are exposed to some positive, but far
from certain, risk of contractual or other legal liability. A brief
overview of the case law in California courts—the leading venue for
litigation relating to the motion-picture industry—illustrates this
intermediate view.
Since at least the late 1940s, California courts have held that the
typical Hollywood contracting sequence—shake hands, start
production, and (maybe) work out the details later—may, but will not
necessarily, result in a legally enforceable agreement. In the 1948
88
decision in Columbia Pictures Corp. v. DeToth, involving an alleged
oral agreement between a director and a studio, a California court
observed that the fact that a “formal written agreement to the same
effect is to be prepared and signed does not alter the binding validity
89
of the oral agreement.” This principle sometimes prevails. In the
most well-known “unsigned deal” litigation, Main Line Pictures, Inc.
90
v. Basinger, a jury found that Kim Basinger (then considered to be
star talent) had entered into a binding personal-services contract with
91
an independent studio to appear in the film Boxing Helena. The

87. Note that there may be more than one ground for nonenforcement in some cases.
Hence, the number of cases under “Grounds for Nonenforcement” exceeds the total number of
“Not Enforce” cases.
88. Columbia Pictures Corp. v. DeToth, 87 Cal. App. 2d 620 (Dist. Ct. App. 1948).
89. Id. at 629.
90. Main Line Pictures, Inc. v. Basinger, No. B077509, 1994 WL 814244 (Cal. Ct. App.
Sept. 22, 1994).
91. Id. at *1–3.
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commitment was based on oral conversations, an unsigned deal
92
memo, and five drafts of a long-form agreement.
Notwithstanding the Basinger decision, it is still true that an oral
or written agreement that is unexecuted or exhibits a low degree of
specificity does not supply a strong basis for contract enforcement.
That assertion is supported by the case-law survey described above: in
more than 70 percent of the identified cases, courts declined to
enforce underformalized or unexecuted agreements. The best-known
93
recent example is the 1998 litigation Coppola v. Warner Bros., Inc.
between the famous director Francis Ford Coppola and major studio
Warner Bros., over a proposed film based on the Pinocchio story. The
trial court declined to find that Coppola was contractually barred
from producing or directing a film based on the Pinocchio story for
another studio, in part because the parties had never finalized certain
elements of their production-services and directing-services
94
agreements.
As the divergent outcomes in the Basinger and Coppola cases
illustrate, parties that elect to participate in transactions under
incompletely specified or unexecuted agreements operate in a “no
man’s land” that is neither fully within nor fully outside contract law.
In a business where nobody knows whether a film will succeed (and
most ultimately do not), it is often the case that nobody knows
whether a particular transaction is being undertaken pursuant to a
legally and practically enforceable contract.
III. AN ECONOMIC ACCOUNT OF HOLLYWOOD CONTRACTING
Hollywood contracting is often dismissed as the result of sloppy
lawyering or the recklessness of creative talent. In this Part, I propose

92. Id. Basinger ultimately prevailed on technical grounds. Id. at *6. The appeals court
found that the district court had committed reversible error by failing to instruct the jury to
reach separate liability determinations with respect to Basinger and her “loan-out” corporation.
Id.
93. Coppola v. Warner Bros., Inc., No. BC135198 (L.A. Sup. Ct. July 12, 1998).
94. Warner Bros.’s argument rested mostly on the fact that Coppola had signed a
certificate of employment that purported to transfer to Warner Bros. all copyright and other
intellectual-property interests relating to Coppola’s contribution to the Pinocchio project. The
court rejected this argument, on grounds that the certificate of employment was “too vague”
and did not meet the requirements of the Copyright Act’s statute of frauds. See Joseph D.
Schleimer, Coppola Verdict’s Impact on Studio/Talent Talks, 14 ENTERTAINMENT L. & FIN.
(1998), http://www.schleimerlaw.com/elf998.htm.
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an account that identifies the economic rationale behind this
seemingly imprudent transactional practice.
A. Existing Explanations
Existing explanations for Hollywood’s soft-contracting practices
do not fully account for this phenomenon. These explanations
include: ignorance or recklessness, timing pressures to commit rapidly
95
to a transaction, and reputational constraints. Ignorance or
recklessness is implausible: both studios and talent are represented by
experienced agents, lawyers, and other advisors who operate in a
competitive market. Timing explanations are unpersuasive for several
reasons: sophisticated law firms routinely prepare complex
agreements for high-stakes transactions in other fields in a matter of
days; entertainment lawyers draft and negotiate highly specified
contracts to govern financing and other transactions; entertainment
lawyers have access to contract templates that often do not require
96
considerable modification; and there may be considerable time
between talent’s “commitment” to the project and the start of
shooting (not to mention the end of shooting). Reputational factors,
however, exert considerable influence in relationship-based industries
such as Hollywood. This is the explanation provided for the use of
97
legally unenforceable contracts in other settings, and it will play an
important role in the ensuing analysis. But an entirely reputationbased explanation falsely anticipates that Hollywood would avoid the

95. See Douglas Kari, Basinger in the Box: Verbal Contracts in the Film Industry, 15 ENT. L.
REP. 3, 3 (1993) (observing that timing pressures explain why the film industry often does not
formalize deals); Bogner, supra note 63, at 364–65 (observing that parties sometimes feel that
negotiating over details of contracts may prevent a project from moving forward); Gary M.
McLaughlin, Note, Oral Contracts in the Entertainment Industry, 1 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 101,
126–27 (2001) (noting that handshake deal practices in the entertainment industry are often
attributed to timing pressures or creative artists’ neglect of legal details, and arguing that
reputational pressures might account for the practice); Rick Smith, Comment, Here’s Why
Hollywood Should Kiss the Handshake Deal Goodbye, 23 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 503, 509–10,
521–24 (2003) (noting that handshake deals are sometimes attributed to timing pressures and
reputational constraints, but arguing that the practice is best attributed to studios’ bargaining
power).
96. See Telephone Interview with Entm’t Attorney I, supra note 42.
97. See Avner Greif, Contract Enforceability and Economic Institutions in Early Trade: The
Maghribi Traders’ Coalition, 83 AM. ECON. REV. 525, 525–31 (1993) (explaining
extracontractual agreements in the context of the Maghribi traders of the eleventh century); see
also Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in the
Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115, 138–43 (1992) (analyzing extracontractual
agreements in the diamond industry).

BARNETT IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

12/2/2014 10:34 PM

632

[Vol. 64:605

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

expense of contractual documentation altogether or, as is common in
other business settings, incur the small cost of including a disclaimer
to avoid unnecessary exposure to legal liability. A mixed explanation
that integrates both legal and reputational sanctions is therefore
required.
B. Theory: The Rationality of Soft Contracts
To appreciate why soft contracting may represent the most
efficient transactional instrument in some talent–studio transactions,
it is necessary to review two alternatives: (1) informal contracts
governed by reputation and (2) formal (hard) contracts governed by
law. A third alternative, vertical integration, is addressed later.
1. Informal Contract (Reputation).
A reputation-based
explanation for unsigned deal practices assumes that talent’s or the
studio’s commitment is self-enforcing even without contractual
liability. That requires assuming that no party will ever abandon a
film project because doing so would curtail talent’s expected profits
on all future projects or would harm a studio’s ability to recruit talent
for future productions. Such unqualified optimism would be naïve.
Hollywood is not usually depicted as a paragon of good-faith
behavior (if anything, some would say quite the opposite!). The
Hollywood press regularly reports cases of apparent opportunism:
98
studios substitute even star actors during development, producers
delay moving forward with projects but keep actors indefinitely “on
99
call,”
actors withdraw from projects shortly before the
commencement of shooting, and, in rare cases, studios terminate
100
actors and directors even after shooting has commenced.

98. In 1995, actor Laurence Fishburne was reportedly dropped from the cast of Die Hard
With a Vengeance in favor of Samuel L. Jackson, who could be retained at a lower fee.
Fishburne sued for breach of contract, despite the absence of a formal agreement. See Bogner,
supra note 63, at 365 n.47. For a review of similar incidents involving Robin Williams, John
Cusack, and other stars, see Ben Child, Robin Williams Unamused by Pay Dispute, THE
GUARDIAN, Oct. 20, 2008, http://www.theguardian.com/film/2008/oct/20/1.
99. This type of action prompted a lawsuit by star actress Sharon Stone against producers
in connection with Basic Instinct 2. Due to allegedly missed opportunities attributable to delays
in production, she claimed $100 million in damages. Basic Instinct 2 (2006): Trivia, INTERNET
MOVIE DATABASE (IMDB) (Mar. 18, 2012), http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0430912/trivia. The
suit was settled out of court. Id.
100. Interview with Studio Exec., supra note 42. This type of action precipitated litigation by
star actress Raquel Welch against MGM for wrongful termination from Cannery Row,
ultimately resulting in a $10 million damages award against the studio for damage to the
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This mixed record of compliance with stated commitments may
reflect the fact that Hollywood exhibits some, but not all, of the
characteristics of the close-knit environments in which reputation101
based transacting has been most convincingly documented.
Hollywood is at best a relatively small world populated by firms and
individuals that do business with each other repeatedly: six major
studios, three major talent agencies, a handful of mini–major studios,
a larger number of independent production companies, a small group
of high-value talent, and a much larger group of lower-value talent
consisting of tens of thousands of actors.
Moreover, membership in these constituencies can be unstable.
Although studios and talent agencies have long lives, independent
production companies, individual producers, and talent often have
102
short careers. Hence, no transacting party can safely assume that
any given counterparty is a repeat player that values the long-term
accumulation of reputational capital. Even repeat players may
rationally deplete reputational capital to avoid an extremely large
one-time loss or to capture an exceptionally large one-time gain.
Because an exceptional hit is an infrequent occurrence, the
temptation to abandon a losing project for an exceptionally promising
opportunity may outweigh long-term reputational considerations. At
best, reputation supplies studios and stars with a partial governance
solution.
2. Formal (Hard) Contract. The ability of a contract to actually
bind parties is always limited by ex ante specification costs and ex
post enforcement costs. Both costs are high in talent–studio
transactions.
a. Specification Costs. It is difficult for the parties to a contract to
specify in verifiable language both the contingencies under which
talent or the studio may “walk away,” consistent with the parties’
agreed-upon understanding, and any fee or other penalty that must
be paid by the terminating party if it exercises the walkaway right.
Even a simple termination clause that provides a walkaway right
under certain circumstances subject to a breakup fee is prone to
forecasting errors. The fee may be set too high or too low, resulting in
actress’s reputation. See Welch v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Film Co., 254 Cal. Rptr. 645, 647
(Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
101. See supra note 100.
102. See LITWAK, supra note 66, at 228–29.
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a contract that is excessively rigid or flexible relative to the efficient
contract design that would be negotiated under conditions of perfect
information and zero transaction costs. In a reputation-rich
environment, specifying a termination fee ex ante may introduce
excessive rigidity into the size of the settlement payout, thereby
impeding parties’ ability to expeditiously reach a reasonable
resolution following industry norms in any ex post termination
103
scenario.
These inherent constraints mean that even a fully
enforceable contract will not necessarily provide the parties with an
efficient governance structure for the proposed transaction.
b. Enforcement Costs. The practical ability to enforce any
agreement is limited for several reasons. It can be difficult to show
breach of a performance obligation. In the film and television
industries, actors who are dissatisfied with existing terms have been
known to feign illness or “phone in” a performance—that is,
104
underperform on set—until a resolution is reached. Even assuming
that a breach can be shown, the plaintiff-studio still faces numerous
obstacles: given the uncertainty of film projects, it may be difficult to
demonstrate expectation damages; the studio cannot obtain a remedy
of specific performance to compel talent to perform an employment
105
contract; and under California law, the studio can obtain a negative
injunction to bar talent from working for another production during
the contract term only if the actor’s services are deemed to be of a
106
“unique” character. To be sure, the threat of contractual liability for
breach at least poses an in terrorem effect that may exert some
deterrent force, in part due to the significant cost of defending against
a legal claim. This threat, however, is far from a perfect enforcement
mechanism.

103. As will be discussed, contracts between talent and studios often adopt a bifurcated
specification strategy with respect to termination. Although the agreement effectively specifies a
liquidated-damages amount, as discounted by the likelihood of nonenforceability, payable by
the studio in the event the studio does not use talent’s services (the pay-or-play clause), no such
fee is specified in the case of termination or nonperformance by talent. Therefore, terminating
or nonperforming talent are exposed to potential expectation damages and negative injunctive
relief, again as discounted by the likelihood of nonenforceability. See infra Part IV.C.2.b.
104. Telephone Interview with Entm’t Attorney I, supra note 42; Interview with Studio
Exec., supra note 42.
105. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3423 (West 2014).
106. Id.
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3. The Unconventional Solution: Soft Contracts. Soft contracting
provides an intermediate governance mechanism that sometimes
secures a higher expected value, net of transaction costs, relative to
either a highly formalized and fully enforceable hard contract, which
would rely entirely or mostly on legal action to secure parties’
commitments, or an unformalized and certainly unenforceable
informal contract, which would impose few transaction costs but rely
entirely on reputational forces to secure compliance.
a. Contractual Formality as Risk Management. Contract scholars,
as well as contract-law jurisprudence, neatly divide promissory
communications into those that are enforceable in contract and those
that are not. However, contractual enforceability is more precisely
viewed in continuous terms as a probabilistic outcome, the likelihood
107
of which is a positive function of contractual formality. Formally,
this can be rendered as follows: E = f(F), where E denotes the
likelihood of being held enforceable in court (0 ≤ E ≤ 1), and F
denotes the level of formalization (0 ≤ F ≤ 1). As depicted in Figure 4
below, transacting parties select the value of F (and therefore E) by
108
investing more or less effort in formalization. Retaining a Wall
Street law firm to draft and negotiate a detailed acquisition
agreement requires hundreds of expensive attorney-hours, easily
translating into tens or even hundreds of thousands of dollars in legal
fees, but securing for the client an instrument with a high level of
enforceability. In contrast, scribbling on a napkin in a Beverly Hills
restaurant is virtually costless, but results in a low to moderate level
of enforceability.

107. Enforceability also requires the exchange of “consideration.” This is not much of a
requirement: minimal values, or even recitals of consideration, are usually considered sufficient
to satisfy this requirement. For extensive discussion, see 1464-Eight, Ltd. v. Joppich, 154 S.W.3d
101, 105–10 (Tex. 2004).
108. Note that the shape of the curve in Figure 4 has been drawn to reflect the reasonable
assumption that, beyond a certain initial stage, additional investments in formalization yield
sharply diminishing marginal returns in the form of increased likelihood of contractual
enforceability. In any given jurisdiction, the relevant curve’s shape will vary, as incremental
formalization may translate into incremental enforceability at a different rate, depending on
relevant case law and any individual court’s actual behavior.

BARNETT IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

12/2/2014 10:34 PM

636

[Vol. 64:605

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

Figure 4. Formalization and Enforceability
1
E

0

x*

x

1
F

Suppose that x represents the level of formalization at which
there is complete certainty that a court will enforce the contract (that
is, E = 1), and at any point below x, there is complete certainty that a
court will not enforce the contract (that is, E = 0). If this were the case
(as is conventionally assumed), then formalization effort would follow
the step function depicted by the dashed line in Figure 4 above: where
F < x, all formalization efforts are wasted, since the increased
likelihood of enforcement is zero; where F > x, all further
formalization efforts are wasted, since there are no marginal gains in
the likelihood of enforcement. But this binary construction does not
track contracting practices in business environments like Hollywood,
where parties regularly select low to moderate values of F. The
continuous function shown above reflects these practices. Provided
there is some positive likelihood that courts will enforce contracts
where F < x (a reasonable assumption under current contract law),
transacting parties will rationally select values well below x—for
example, F = x*, as shown above—if the cost of any incremental
formalization would exceed incremental benefit in the form of
increased enforceability. In any particular transaction, parties may
elect to invest greater resources and enter into a “high-F”
commitment (denoted by x) having a high degree of legal
enforceability, or invest fewer resources and enter into a “low-F”
commitment (denoted by x*) having a low degree of legal
enforceability.
This marginalist approach toward the enforceability of a contract
can be viewed as a logical extension of the well-established
marginalist approach taken among law-and-economics scholars
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toward the enforceability of any particular contractual term. This
approach assumes that parties rationally underinvest in specification
efforts with respect to any particular term in order to economize on
the expected sum of specification costs ex ante plus dispute-resolution
109
costs ex post. This nicely explains why even the most sophisticated
contracts are inherently incomplete. By extension, we can anticipate
that parties may sometimes elect to underinvest in formalization efforts
with respect to an agreement taken as a whole. Specifically, parties will
do so in order to endanger contract formation and thereby generate
an implicit termination option that cannot be drafted more explicitly
at a net positive return, taking into account the costs required to
achieve a higher degree of formalization. The following examines this
scenario in more detail.
Exercise of this implicit termination option is achieved by
withdrawing or announcing withdrawal from the project. Upon
withdrawal, the exercising party expects to pay an exercise price as
follows: p = d + l, where d denotes the expected damages award or
settlement payment in lieu of damages, and l denotes the expected
litigation and other dispute-resolution costs. The value of d is a
function of the expectation damages that would be awarded by a
court in the event of breach, as discounted by the likelihood that the
court would determine that the parties had entered into an
110
enforceable contract. By setting the likelihood of enforceability, the
level of formalization operates as a “meta-term” that calibrates the
price of exercising the termination option. Everything else being
equal, low-F contracts result in lower expected damages and, as a
result, lower settlement payouts, while high-F contracts have the
opposite effect. The rationale is as follows. At high levels of
formalization, nonbreaching parties can expect to incur lower costs in
demonstrating contract formation and pose a more credible litigation
threat, which means that, holding constant all substantive terms,
breaching parties expect to pay higher amounts in order to avoid or
halt litigation with a settlement payout. Conversely, at low levels of
formalization, nonbreaching parties can expect to incur higher costs
in demonstrating contract formation and pose a less-credible
litigation threat, which means that, again holding constant all

109. See Richard A. Posner, The Law and Economics of Contract Interpretation, 83 TEX. L.
REV. 1581, 1610 (2005).
110. I ignore for now the reputational cost of exercising the implicit termination right. Later,
I integrate reputation effects into the analysis.
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substantive terms, breaching parties expect to pay lower amounts in
order to avoid or halt litigation with a settlement payout.
To illustrate, suppose an actor has made a low-F commitment to
appear in a particular film: that is, he has entered into an uncertainly
enforceable commitment that implies a positive but discounted
111
penalty in case of termination. The absence of an entirely reliable
legal instrument to secure that commitment provides the actor with
an implicit termination right that will be exercised whenever the actor
believes that gm > p, where gm denotes the actor’s expected marginal
112
net gains on an alternative project. At the same time, the presence
of even an insecure legal instrument generates positive values for d
and l, which together constitute the expected exercise price, p, that
induces talent to perform within a certain range of circumstances in
which he anticipates marginal net gains by moving to an alternative
113
As reflected in
opportunity (that is, where gm > 0 but gm < p).
Figure 5 below, talent will rationally perform, irrespective of any net
positive outside opportunity, just up to p—that is, the point at which

111. For convenience, the following discussion analyzes the decision whether to perform or
breach from the talent’s perspective. The same framework could be applied from the studio’s
perspective. In practice, contracts between studio and talent—assuming legal enforceability—
typically specify a liquidated-damages amount payable by the studio in the event that it does not
employ talent’s services (the pay-or-play clause), but contain no such clause in the case of
termination or other nonperformance by talent, which therefore exposes talent to a
combination of expected damages and negative injunctive relief. As discussed later, the
enforceability of the pay-or-play clause is often in doubt due to certain contractual ambiguities.
See infra notes 148–51 and accompanying text. Hence, even assuming perfect enforceability of
the underlying agreement, the studio’s legal exposure upon terminating an actor may be
imprecisely defined.
112. More formally, gm = g2 – g1, where g1 equals the expected net gains on the existing
project, and g2 equals the expected net gains on an alternative project. Note that, for talent,
gains and losses are not solely defined by short-term monetary outcomes. Participation in a
“hit” can result in reputational gains that translate into higher compensation on future projects;
the opposite outcome can result from participation in a “flop.”
113. Of course, parties could replicate the incentive structure of a soft contract by entering
into a fully formalized contract and inserting an appropriate termination fee or other liquidateddamages clause that enables one or both parties to withdraw whenever the costs of performance
exceed a certain threshold. Soft contracts will therefore only provide a more-efficient
alternative to a hard contract in circumstances where the former both imposes a lower
specification-cost and negotiation-cost burden and secures approximately the same expected
outcome that would result under a hard contract. As discussed later, these assumptions are most
likely to be satisfied in repeat-play environments that enable parties to economize on
formalization expenditures by relying in part on reputational sanctions to regulate counterparty
opportunism.
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the marginal net gains from an outside opportunity equal the penalty
114
for exercising the implicit termination option.
From the talent’s perspective, we can anticipate three outcomes
under a soft contract, as shown in Figure 5:
1. Voluntary performance (gm < 0): Talent anticipates a net
marginal gain under the contract and performs irrespective of any
expected legal penalty.
2. Involuntary performance (0 < gm < gm*): Talent anticipates a net
marginal loss under the contract but performs due to the expected
damages payment and legal costs that would be incurred upon
termination.
3. Termination (0 < gm > gm*): Talent anticipates a net marginal
loss under the contract and terminates to capture incremental gains
on an outside opportunity, even after taking into account the
expected damages payment and legal costs that would be incurred
upon termination.

Taken together, these three possible outcomes mean that talent
effectively commits to perform except in the case of sufficiently highvalue outside opportunities (that is, cases where 0 < gm > gm*). If these
high-value outside opportunities arise, talent will either withhold
performance, incur dispute-resolution costs, pay a settlement amount
115
to the studio, and then capture the gains on the outside opportunity;
or continue performance and receive a continuation payoff that
accounts for the forfeited marginal gains on the outside opportunity
less the savings in avoided dispute-resolution costs and damages
payments. The studio will deliver the continuation payoff so long as it
is less than the expected cost the studio will incur in locating a
substitute for the star or canceling the project plus the expected
amount recoverable from the star in the event of litigation, net of
legal fees. Whether talent elects termination or renegotiation, he is
put in the same position and enjoys a net gain equal to gm – p.

114. Note that Figure 5 holds constant the exercise price, p, but varies gm, the party’s
expected marginal net gains on an alternative opportunity.
115. Note that, in practice, the talent’s new employer will sometimes pay the settlement
amount by “buying out” the talent’s contract.
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Figure 5. Possible Outcomes Under a Soft Contract
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b. Reputational Constraints. While soft contracting saves on
transaction costs relative to hard contracting, it does not supply a
workable governance instrument in the absence of reputational
penalties and common knowledge of market norms. Without a clear
documentary point of reference enforceable by a court or some other
adjudicative agent, participants must share, and usually conform to, a
common understanding of the conditions under which it is
116
Otherwise soft“reasonable” and “unreasonable” to breach.
contracting environments are liable to suffer from deviations from the
parties’ implicitly agreed-upon set of termination-and-renegotiation
options. These deviations can run in both directions. Nonperforming
parties may terminate unreasonably, resulting in “overtermination”
relative to the set of circumstances in which the parties had implicitly
agreed to perform. Or performing parties may litigate against
reasonably terminating parties, resulting in “undertermination”
relative to the set of circumstances in which the parties had implicitly
agreed not to perform. Anticipating those outcomes, parties would
rationally revert to hard-contracting instruments in order to
implement their agreement, even taking into account the transaction
costs required to achieve higher degrees of formalization.
Overtermination: In the absence of a certainly enforceable
agreement, opportunistic, uninformed, or misinformed parties can
misuse the termination option embedded in a soft contract by
withdrawing in a manner inconsistent with the parties’ implicitly
116. For a similar view, see W. Bentley MacLeod, Reputations, Relationships, and Contract
Enforcement, 65 J. ECON. LIT. 595, 595–628 (2007) (“For a given transaction, there will be a
number of ways that parties can define breach.”).
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agreed-upon risk allocation. This would be equivalent to talent
withdrawing from the project in cases not involving sufficiently highvalue outside opportunities (that is, a case where gm < gm*). The result
is an excessively flexible contract that overexposes the studio to
holdup risk ex post—or more precisely, exposes the studio to a level
of holdup risk that was not reflected in the deal terms—and, by
anticipation, would compel parties to incur additional specification
costs ex ante or forego the transaction altogether. Reputational
liability increases the exercise price due upon termination and
thereby protects against downward shifts in the threshold point—that
is, the threshold value of opportunity costs from continued
participation—at which talent rationally terminates, or credibly seeks
117
to renegotiate, further participation in the project.
This can be illustrated by the following example. After the studio
has commenced shooting, any high-value talent in a lead role should
rationally hold up the studio for additional compensation in an
amount approaching the studio’s entire expected profit on the film. In
practice, nothing close to this extreme form of holdup behavior
actually occurs: even in the absence of a signed deal, talent attorneys
report that they renegotiate open terms following production but
118
refrain from renegotiating the fixed compensation. This social
restraint on transactional opportunism limits the studio’s expected
exposure to holdup by talent and enables the parties to enter into the
project at a low level of formalization and with a large savings in
transaction costs.
Undertermination: A soft contract implies both the absence of a
certainly enforceable agreement and the presence of an uncertainly
enforceable agreement. Given the latter effect, nonterminating
parties can contest a “reasonable” exercise of the termination option
through legal action or resist “reasonable” settlements to preempt or
resolve any such legal action, even if the option is exercised in a
manner that is consistent with the implicitly agreed-upon risk
allocation. This would be equivalent to the terminating party being
forced to incur dispute-resolution costs and make damages payments
that discourage it from withdrawing from the project in cases
117. Formally, this requires a revision to the earlier formalization of a party’s breach–
compliance calculation. A party will now rationally perform whenever gm > p, where p = d + l +
r. Variables d and l are defined as above, and r is defined as the reputational cost associated
with any observed breach.
118. See Telephone Interview with Entm’t Attorney II, supra note 52; Telephone Interview
with Entm’t Attorney III, supra note 42.
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involving sufficiently high-value outside opportunities (that is, a case
where gm ≥ gm*). The result is an excessively rigid contract, which, by
anticipation, would compel parties to incur greater specification costs
ex ante or forego the transaction altogether. Reputational penalties
against non-terminating parties inflate the cost of using legal action
“aggressively” to contest exercise of the termination option, or to
reject “reasonable” settlement terms, including continuation terms,
offered by the terminating party (or, when talent breaches, the
terminating party’s new employer). Those reputational penalties
protect against upward shifts in the threshold point—that is, the
threshold level of opportunity costs from continued performance—at
which a party may terminate involvement, subject to making an
appropriate payment to the nonterminating party.
Reputational pressures explain why studios usually do not bring
legal action against a high-value actor who terminates his
participation in a film project, electing instead to expeditiously
resolve the matter by mutual agreement and put an end to any actual
119
or threatened litigation.
The most well-known unsigned-deal
120
litigation, the Basinger case discussed above, supplies the exception
that proves the rule. Hollywood was surprised by both the production
company’s initial victory in this litigation as well as the fact that the
production company brought suit at all. As one commentator has
suggested, the unusually aggressive response to Basinger’s withdrawal
from the film may have been initiated because the counterparty was a
121
small production company experiencing financial difficulties. That
corresponds to an “end-game” scenario whereby a party loses its
rational incentive to preserve long-term reputational gains by
conforming to a social norm that discourages initiating litigation in
response to termination.
IV. APPLICATION: EXPLAINING FORMALIZATION CHOICES
Viewing contract formality as a deal term that serves as a proxy
for legal enforceability, which in turn sets forth the parameters of a
termination-and-renegotiation option, provides the basis for
accounting for observed differences in contract formalization. Field
interviews and trade-press coverage indicate that parties’
119. See Interview with Studio Exec., supra note 42.
120. See supra Part II.D.2.b.
121. See Kari, supra note 95, at 4–5. For the litigation, see Main Line Pictures, Inc. v.
Basinger, No. B077509, 1994 WL 814244 (Cal. Ct. App. Sept. 22, 1994).
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formalization preferences differ not only across transactions but also
with respect to different parties, elements, and stages of a transaction.
As reflected in Figure 6 below, parties’ formalization preferences are
influenced by (1) the specification-cost and enforcement-cost
expenditures required to replicate that same flexibility at a higher
level of formality; (2) the holdup risk to which a party is exposed as it
makes specific investments in the project; and (3) reputational
constraints and transactional knowledge—that is, familiarity with
industry norms—that limit parties’ exposure to holdup risk even at
reduced formalization levels. Hard (high-F) contracts are most likely
to be used when specification costs and enforcement costs are
sufficiently low, holdup risk is sufficiently high, and counterparties
possess insufficient reputational capital and transactional knowledge
to credibly pledge against opportunism. Soft (low-F) contracts are
most likely to be used when these values are inverted: when
enforcement costs and specification costs are sufficiently high, holdup
risk is sufficiently low, and parties hold sufficient stocks of
reputational capital and transactional knowledge to credibly pledge
against opportunism. Informal (zero-F) instruments are used when
these values are extremely inverted.
Figure 6. Factors that Influence Formalization Preferences
+ +

Zero-F Contracts
Low-F (Soft) Contracts

Reputational
Constraints and
Transactional
Knowledge

Specification and
Enforcement Costs
High-F (Hard) Contracts

0
0

Holdup Risk

+0

The result of this process of continuous adaptation is a document
package consisting of multiple deal elements memorialized at
different levels of formalization. Contrary to popular impressions, this
apparently sloppy approach to contractual documentation is neither
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reckless nor unintended. Rather, it reflects a calculated tradeoff—
with respect to each deal element, deal stage, and deal participant—
that weighs the marginal transactional flexibility and cost savings
from reduced formalization against the marginal increased risk of
holdup and other forms of counterparty opportunism.
A. Transaction Timeline
Over the course of a talent–studio transaction, there are three
distinct stages at which either party could fail to conform to some, or
all, elements of its commitment:
Stage I: At any time before shooting, talent or the studio may
terminate its involvement in the project (or the studio may proceed
with the project but terminate talent’s involvement). Withdrawal by
studio or talent prior to shooting is the fact pattern at issue in most of
the contract-formation cases identified through the case-law and
122
trade-press survey. A variant of this fact pattern arises in the case of
sequels, when stars threaten to withdraw pending resolution of an
123
Fear of this type of holdup
increase to the star’s compensation.
scenario may explain why the studio that backed the Lord of the
Rings trilogy undertook the enormous expense of shooting the entire
124
trilogy at the same time. By doing so, the studio eliminated its
exposure to holdup risk in the event that either of the first two films
in the anticipated series achieved commercial success.
Stage II: Once shooting has started, a party may terminate its
involvement in the project. There are few reported cases of this type

122. See Apps. A, B.
123. This type of behavior gave rise to a suit between Universal Pictures and Michael
Oliver, a ten-year-old actor in the Problem Child movie series. Oliver’s guardian renegotiated
his salary before the shooting of the sequel, Problem Child II. Universal later refused to pay the
additional amount on the ground that it had agreed to the increased compensation under
duress, given its investment in production and other expenses. See Diana Haithman, Problem
Child Part III – The Courtroom, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 23, 1992, available at PROQUEST (“In its
complaint, Universal states that Oliver and Ponce forced Universal to renegotiate under
‘economic duress.’”). A jury agreed, and the originally negotiated amount was reinstated. Id.
124. See Associated Press, ‘Hobbit’ Trilogy Cost $561M So Far, VARIETY, Oct. 4, 2013,
http://variety.com/2013/film/news/hobbit-trilogy-has-cost-561-million-so-far-1200694351 (“The
trilogy also appears to be one of the most expensive movie productions in which two or more
movies are shot at the same time.”). I am grateful to Victor Goldberg for bringing this point to
my attention. The same “film it all at once” strategy was used in the Pirates of the Caribbean
sequels: Pirates of the Caribbean: At World’s End and Pirates of the Caribbean: Dead Man’s
Chest.
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of behavior in film projects, most likely due to the severe reputational
125
sanctions that a party would suffer by terminating at this point.
Stage III: After theatrical release, the studio may fail to
distribute box-office revenues as had been promised to talent, or
talent may claim to be owed “back-end” compensation—that is, a
contractually agreed-upon portion of the film’s net profits after the
studio has recouped its costs—based on a position that is inconsistent
with the parties’ understanding. This type of behavior, typically
resulting in complaints by talent against a studio, appears to be
common, even in the case of hard contracts, and is usually resolved
126
through a formalized “participation audit.”
Figure 7. Transaction Timeline (Talent–Studio)
Failure or
Moderate Success

Stage I
Talent &
Studio
“Commit”

Stage II

Shooting Starts
Studio Secures
Financing or
Makes Other Large
Financial
Commitment

Stage III
Theatrical Release

Exceptional
Success &
Talent’s Back-End
Compensation
Triggered

125. I am aware of two such cases. The studio that made Back to the Future terminated the
original lead (Eric Stoltz) for the movie after four weeks of shooting and then hired Michael J.
Fox to play the lead role. This change, and associated reshooting, added $3 million to the
movie’s budget. See Back to the Future Trivia, INTERNET MOVIE DATABASE (IMDB), http://
www.imdb.com/title/tt0088763/trivia (last visited Nov. 18, 2014) (“[R]eshooting Stolz’s scenes
added $3 million to the budget.”). In another case, a studio terminated then-star Raquel Welch
from a film, which resulted in litigation. For further details, see supra note 100. One interviewee
reported that, in rare cases, studios have terminated directors and actors shortly after shooting
has commenced if their performance is unsatisfactory. See Interview with Studio Exec., supra
note 42.
126. For a description of recent disputes in this area, see Bryan M. Sullivan, Audit Trend
Puts Movie Studios Up in Lights, LAW360 (Jan. 7, 2013), http://www.law360.com/articles/405212.
These disputes typically arise due to the complex definitions and formulas used to identify and
calculate the costs that a studio must recoup before its contractual commitment to provide
talent with a portion of the remaining net profits is triggered. Obviously, the studio makes every
effort to craft and interpret contractual clauses that preclude activation of any such payout from
net profits.
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B. Formalization Differences by Counterparty
Interviewee reports and trade commentary reveal a basic pattern
in Hollywood’s choice of soft- and hard-contracting instruments as a
function of the type of counterparty involved. In the case of
transactions involving lower-value talent, outside financing, and
suppliers of other noncreative inputs, Hollywood tends to prefer hard
127
contracts. In the case of transactions involving higher-value talent,
128
Hollywood sometimes prefers soft contracts. This basic difference
can be accounted for by simple differences in reputational capital and
transactional knowledge. In the former case, the counterparty is likely
to be lacking in both respects: as talent, it may be a newcomer to the
industry; as an outside investor, it may be a one-shot player who
misconstrues the implicit termination-and-renegotiation option
embedded in a soft contract. In the latter case, both the star and the
studio are parties that have (or are represented by an intermediary
that has) observable reputational stock and transactional knowledge,
which limits the anticipated level of opportunism risk. As a result,
parties are rationally willing to make investments in a relationship
129
under lower levels of formalization.
127. See Interview with Studio Exec., supra note 42; Interview with Entm’t Attorney I, supra
note 41.
128. See Interview with Entm’t Attorney I, supra note 41; Interview with Entm’t Attorney
III, supra note 41; Interview with Studio Counsel II, supra note 44; Telephone Interview with
Studio Counsel III, supra note 44; Interview with Mini–Major Studio Counsel, supra note 48.
Major studios appear to differ in their perceived willingness to proceed on an “unsigned” basis
with stars and other higher-value talent. Based on interviews with a selected set of industry
participants, it appears that one of the six major studios has a reputation for historically
requiring execution of a long-form agreement as a precondition for commencing shooting.
Another of the major studios has a reputation for historically being more relaxed in allowing
production to move forward without a signed long-form agreement, while views were mixed or
unclear as to the historical or current policies at other studios. See Telephone Interview with
Studio Counsel I, supra note 49; Interview with Studio Counsel II, supra note 45; Telephone
Interview with Studio Counsel III, supra note 44; Interview with Mini–Major Studio Counsel,
supra note 49; Telephone Interview with Entm’t Attorney I, supra note 42; Telephone Interview
with Entm’t Attorney III, supra note 42. Views with respect to “unsigned deal policies” may
differ within the same studio, see Interview with Entm’t Attorney I, supra note 41, and those
polices may change over time in response to market conditions, see id.; Telephone Interview
with Studio Counsel III, supra note 44.
129. Some interviewees, trade commentators, and readers attribute unsigned deals between
stars and studios to the latter’s bargaining leverage. Although this is an intuitive explanation, it
is difficult to reconcile with fully rational contracting behavior: compelling the studio to operate
at a low level of formalization would not make the star any better off since the studio would
presumably adjust other terms to reflect its greater anticipated exposure to holdup risk. It is
therefore more coherent to say that the studio agrees to low formalization with a star because
the latter can pledge its reputational capital against future opportunism, thereby limiting the
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C. Differences by Time and Transaction Element
Studios’ and stars’ formalization preferences evolve throughout
the course of a film’s production and differ with respect to different
elements of a transaction. These changes and differences in
formalization preferences can be accounted for by reference to the
factors mentioned above: specification and enforcement costs, holdup
risk, and reputational constraints and transactional knowledge.
1. Development. At this stage, both studio and talent place a
high value on being able to withdraw in the event that unfavorable
information is received, and therefore typically agree on reduced
contractual formality in the form of an oral agreement or unsigned
deal memo. Both parties are exposed to the risk of positive and
negative fluctuations in the expected value of the project (or the
130
star ), as assessed relative to other opportunities, in which case any
agreed-upon deal may turn out to be dramatically misvalued. For
both the studio and the star, a soft contract provides the flexibility to
respond to new information by terminating, or threatening to
terminate, involvement at a reduced risk of legal liability. At a
transaction-cost savings, this is equivalent to writing a fully formalized
contract with a high degree of flexibility—for example, a broadly
defined walkaway right and a low breakup fee in an acquisition
transaction. Even if greater transactional certainty could be achieved
through a more formalized contract, an unsigned deal may represent
a rational underinvestment in specification and negotiation costs
given the fact that most film projects are shelved or abandoned in the
131
development stage,
in which case all investments, legal and
otherwise, would be forfeited.

studio’s holdup risk at a transaction-cost savings relative to a more formalized contracting
instrument. This is consistent with one interviewee’s statement that tolerating an unsigned deal
can benefit a studio by saving on concessions, Telephone Interview with Studio Counsel III,
supra note 45, that would be required to reach a signed deal.
130. A star’s expected value is dependent on, among other things, past observed
performance in other productions. During the intervening period between the point at which a
studio and talent commit to a particular project and the point at which production commences,
the star’s value may change depending on whether he or she has participated in a hit or a flop.
131. See Telephone Interview with Entm’t Attorney I, supra note 42; see also RICHARD
CAVES, CREATIVE INDUSTRIES: CONTRACTS BETWEEN ART AND COMMERCE 113 (2002) (“A
Twentieth Century Fox executive stated that the company receives 10,000 screenplays,
treatments, books, and oral pitches yearly, puts 70 to 100 projects into development, but makes
only twelve films.”).
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2. Pre-Production. At this stage, the studio’s and the star’s
formalization preferences diverge to a certain extent. The studio now
makes increased investments in the human and nonhuman assets
required to execute a film project, and therefore places increased
value on contractual formality to secure talent’s participation and
neutralize any exposure to holdup behavior. In the event that the star
withdraws from the film, the studio may have breached a
representation made to outside financiers concerning the use of a
132
particular star, and the financiers may then be able to withdraw
their commitments or renegotiate financing terms to the studio’s
133
disadvantage. However, high-value talent often resists the studio’s
demand for a finalized long-form agreement. Reportedly the talent’s
attorneys sometimes do so in order to preserve leverage on
134
negotiating open deal points. Some even explicitly recommend that
clients seek to avoid liability by asserting that no contract ever existed
and “being uncooperative” in order to “renegotiate the terms that
135
really concern you.” In some cases, talent has used the nonexistence
of a certainly binding contract “to shop the deal” to other interested
studios, thereby precipitating a bidding contest that enables talent to
capture more of the project’s expected value and, consequently,
136
expropriate part of the studio’s sunk investment in the project.
Negotiation between studio and star over the level of contractual
formality during this critical stage yields a patchwork result in which
different levels of formalization apply to various terms of the
transaction. Roughly speaking, the studio’s and star’s representatives
appear to select increased formalization with respect to any particular
element at any particular point in time as holdup risk increases and
specification costs fall, and vice versa. This assumes that both parties
hold a sufficient level of reputational capital and market knowledge—
without which the parties would be compelled to select hard
132. See Telephone Interview with Studio Counsel III, supra note 45.
133. See supra text accompanying note 92.
134. See Double Trouble Irks Legal Eagles, supra note 41; Telephone Interview with Entm’t
Attorney III, supra note 42; Interview with Studio Exec., supra note 42.
135. See Dennis Ardi & Meredith Lobel, How to Break a Contract, DAILY VARIETY, Nov.
7, 1986.
136. This may describe the fate of Warner Bros. in a dispute with Francis Ford Coppola,
who used the lack of a fully executed long-form agreement to argue (successfully) that he was
free to “shop” to other studios a film project (Pinocchio) originally developed in partnership
with Warner Bros. In that case, Warner Bros. executives testified that they often have great
difficulty in obtaining written confirmations of oral commitments from talent’s attorneys. See
Schleimer, supra note 1.
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contracting as the only viable transactional instrument. The typical
resulting document package, organized by decreasing degree of
137
formalization, is as follows.
a. Certificate of Engagement.
At the highest level of
formalization, studios usually require that talent execute a “certificate
of engagement,” which assigns to the studio all of talent’s intellectual138
property rights in the film production.
The certificate of
engagement protects the studio against the most salient holdup
threat—for example, a lawsuit for injunctive relief on the eve of a
movie’s release—at a nominal specification cost.
b. Deal Memo; Pay-or-Play Clause. At an intermediate level of
formalization, the deal memo typically sets forth some or all of the
following terms: the fixed compensation; the talent’s role; screen
credit; the start and end dates of filming; in some cases, expenses and
some perquisites; and, in abbreviated form, the contingent
139
compensation based on the film’s revenues. The deal memo often
includes a pay-or-play commitment that obligates the studio to pay
talent all or part of the fixed compensation even if talent’s services
are not used, subject to triggering conditions and, in some cases, a
140
force majeure clause. Even if the deal memo is unsigned, as is a

137. Note that the document package described below is intended to be representative of
soft-contracting transactions in general. Individual transactions may not include all the
document types described below.
138. See Interview with Studio Counsel II, supra note 45.
139. This list is based on the terms that appeared most commonly in a review of short-form
agreements disclosed in litigation, publicly available deal-memo templates, interviews with
entertainment attorneys, and trade commentary. For further discussion, see also KELLY
CHARLES CRABB, THE MOVIE BUSINESS: THE DEFINITIVE GUIDE TO THE LEGAL AND
FINANCIAL SECRETS OF GETTING YOUR MOVIE MADE 151–64 (2005) (outlining these common
terms and some others that may be included in talent–studio agreements). Interviewees
differed over whether perquisites were part of the deal memo.
140. Those conditions are vital to determining the actual security provided by a pay-or-play
commitment. Typically used conditions include agreements securing outside financing; the
absence of a force majeure event; securing other talent on a pay-or-play basis; or, most
aggressively, a “final approved bonded budget” (that is, the studio’s final approval to commence
shooting). See MOORE, supra note 39, at 197. Pay-or-play provisions granted to directors are
often conditioned on approval by the studio of the final screenplay and engagement by the
studio of the principal cast on a pay-or-play basis. See HOLLYWOOD DEALMAKING:
NEGOTIATING TALENT AGREEMENTS FOR FILM, TV AND NEW MEDIA 102–03 (Dina Appleton
& Daniel Yankelevits eds., 2010) (“[T]he director will be deemed pay-or-play when . . . . [t]he
studio has approved the final screenplay [and] . . . engaged the principal cast on a pay-or-play
basis.”).
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or the conditions to the pay-or-play
common occurrence,
142
commitment remain unspecified, that commitment is partially
supported by reputational forces and, in some cases, by an escrow
143
Note that the pay-or-play commitment not only
mechanism.
protects talent against losses incurred as a result of termination by the
studio but, as a liquidated-damages clause, also protects the studio by
capping the damages it owes talent in the event that the studio
terminates the actor or the project. That protection is only partial,
however, so long as the underlying instrument remains unsigned, the
triggering conditions remain unspecified, or the commitment is
subject to either strict triggering conditions or a broad force majeure
clause—as is suggested by reported failures to honor pay-or-play
144
commitments.
c. Draft Long-Form Agreement. The remaining terms, as set
forth in drafts of the long-form agreement, are subject to the lowest
level of formalization and are therefore prone to renegotiation in the
course of production. These primarily include all the terms set forth
in the deal memo but now specified in significantly greater detail.
Such terms include talent’s screen and advertising credit, expenses,
perquisites, contingent compensation, and the vesting schedule and
145
triggering events for the pay-or-play commitment. The studio may
141. See Interview with Studio Exec., supra note 42.
142. Id.
143. See CRABB, supra note 139, at 219 (“[A]gents in Hollywood are likely to demand that
the actor’s fee be put in an escrow account and paid out to the actor according to the actor’s
agreement.”).
144. For litigation by stars who claimed that production entities had failed to honor an
unsigned pay-or-play commitment, see Child, supra note 98 (involving Robin Williams); Basic
Instinct 2 (2006): Did You Know?, supra note 99 (involving Sharon Stone). SAG maintains an
“Unfair List” of production companies that cancel projects and then refuse to honor pay-or-play
commitments to talent. The list had over one hundred entries for the period from September
2006 through June 2011. The Unfair List, SCREEN ACTORS GUILD (2011), http://www.sag.org/
files/sag/documents/TheUnfairList_as_of_June2011.pdf.
145. Nonprice terms that typically appear in an actor’s agreement include approval rights
concerning use of talent’s name, likeness, and image; creative-approval rights; post-production
obligations (for example, terms for “retakes”); promotional obligations; a performance-standard
and morals clause; definitions of default and force majeure events, which negate the pay-or-play
commitment; auditing and accounting mechanisms relating to the contingent compensation; a
specification of the governing law; and dispute-resolution mechanisms. A director’s agreement
includes terms similar to those in actors’ agreements, in addition to the terms specific to the
director’s role. For useful discussion, see CRABB, supra note 139, at 217–23. For a sample actor’s
agreement, see Selz, supra note 21, App. A-21. For a sample director’s agreement, see MARK
LITWAK, DEALMAKING IN THE FILM AND TELEVISION INDUSTRY: FROM NEGOTIATION TO
FINAL CONTRACTS 135–47 (3d ed. 2009).
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elect to proceed without a “signed up” deal given the star’s and his or
her representatives’ observable reputational capital, which reduces
146
holdup risk, and the specification costs plus deal concessions, which
would have to be incurred to reach a fully signed-up deal.
3. Production. At this stage, the studio and the star have almost
diametrically opposed formalization preferences. The studio places a
high value on contractual formality since it has made a large
irreversible investment in the star and other assets in a production
predicated on the star’s participation. Even the slightest delay in
production translates immediately into significant costs and
endangers completion because the cast has typically committed to
perform only during a limited period. But high-value talent has little
reason to enter into a contract at this stage. If, as is typical, the studio
has made a pay-or-play commitment in existing draft documentation,
the studio has a limited ability to disclaim that commitment once
shooting has commenced, at least as a reputational matter.
Additionally, the absence of executed long-form documentation
enables the star’s representative to engage in renegotiation of open
147
nonprice terms, subject to reputational constraints. Executing a
fully formalized agreement would forfeit renegotiation opportunities
while delivering little value in the form of protection against
opportunism by the studio, which has few holdup opportunities given
the difficulty of substituting comparable talent once shooting has
commenced. Perhaps for that reason, star actor Charlton Heston
boasted that he had never started production on a film with a signed
148
completed contract.
That is, Heston always had sufficient
reputational capital to preserve his renegotiation option and, as a
difficult-to-replace human capital asset, had little reason to fear being
held up by the studio.
V. WHY NOT VERTICAL INTEGRATION?
Holdup risk, severe uncertainty, high specification and
enforcement costs, and positive but limited reputation effects are
146. See Interview with Studio Counsel III, supra note 45.
147. The studio is not always helpless on this front. One interviewee reported that studios
sometimes hold back a certain percentage of talent’s compensation contingent upon execution
of a long-form agreement. See Telephone Interview with Entm’t Attorney III, supra note 42.
148. See Charlton Heston, Of Trust, Manners and How Hollywood Works, L.A. TIMES
(Apr. 12, 1993), http://articles.latimes.com/1993-04-12/entertainment/ca-21971_1_hollywoodworks.
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hardly unique to the movie industry. These challenging conditions are
often addressed through a simpler alternative to contract: vertical
integration that eliminates arm’s-length transactions altogether. That
well-known solution follows a basic principle of transaction-cost
economics. When it is too costly to contract to protect against holdup
risk, one party may acquire the other party and replace contract with
the managerial fiat that governs relationships within an integrated
corporate entity—in this case, converting the talent–studio
relationship from a one-off contracting relationship to a long-term
employment relationship. Conversely, when it is too costly to
undertake the relevant activity within an internal firm-based
structure, parties will transition to arm’s-length contractual structures.
Following Ronald Coase’s fundamental proposition, observed
transaction structures reflect the comparative costs of using market149
based rather than firm-based structures.
Roughly speaking, Hollywood appears to have migrated from a
firm-based to a market-based system for coordinating the supply of
creative and noncreative inputs for purposes of motion-picture
production. However, closer scrutiny shows that Hollywood’s
transactional path is more nuanced and does not fully conform to this
standard sequence.
From the 1920s through the late 1940s, Hollywood operated
under a firm-based structure. The studio system secured both the
studio’s and talent’s commitments to an unspecified series of film
productions, which then took place within the confines of the
150
studio. Studios signed talent to multiyear contracts that guaranteed
the talent fixed compensation during the contract term, akin to an
extended pay-or-play commitment, subject to the studio’s option to
terminate or extend the contract at periodic intervals up to a total
151
period of seven years per interval. Any actor who refused to
perform in a particular project would be “suspended” and the missed
152
time added to the term of the contract. The latter clause was
effectively a pre-agreed negative injunction that mitigated the studio’s
exposure to holdup by talent that had accumulated (with the studio’s

149. See Coase, supra note 10. For subsequent articulations of this thesis, see WILLIAMSON,
supra note 17; Klein, supra note 17.
150. For the authoritative account of this period, see generally THOMAS SCHATZ, THE
GENIUS OF THE SYSTEM: HOLLYWOOD FILMMAKING IN THE STUDIO ERA (2010).
151. See Kindem, supra note 22, at 84.
152. See SCHATZ, supra note 150, at 84.
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153

assistance) valuable reputational capital. The transactional security
of a long-term employment arrangement both protected the studio
against opportunistic renegotiation by a star—with some
154
exceptions —and, within the term of any option renewal, protected
talent against opportunistic renegotiation by the studio.
Starting in the late 1940s, the advent of television reduced the
volume of films demanded by the market and made it unprofitable
for the studio to bear the cost of maintaining a standing pool of
155
creative and technical personnel. The standard sequence anticipated
by transaction-cost economics anticipates that the industry would
have then migrated to a governance structure based on market-based
contractual agreements. This is partially true. Starting in the late
1940s, Hollywood evolved toward the disaggregated transactional
structure familiar today: a hub of major studios that engage outside
156
talent and production and other entities on a project-specific basis.
But these one-shot transactions do not operate subject exclusively to
the soft-contracting mechanisms typically associated with marketbased relationships. Rather, as this Article has demonstrated in detail,
Hollywood operates subject to a mix of short-term hard contractual
agreements, which rely primarily on formal enforcement, and repeatplay soft contractual agreements, which rely significantly on
reputational enforcement.
Hollywood’s historical shifts between firm-based and marketbased relationships can be explained as an efficient response to the
transactional hazards associated with film production and
distribution. Historical evidence suggests that the soft contract took
on greater prominence in Hollywood roughly when the studio system
entered into decline. The surveys of reported litigation and case law
described earlier found only one court decision, and one other
reported dispute, relating to contract formation in connection with a
film project before 1947—precisely the time at which the studio
157
system began to unravel. Moreover, those two disputes arose in the

153. This did not always work. Some of the most famous stars attempted to withdraw from
their contracts, including James Cagney and Bette Davis. See id. at 138–39, 218–20.
154. See supra note 153.
155. See MICHAEL HAUPERT, THE ENTERTAINMENT INDUSTRY 117–18 (2006).
156. See Joseph Lampel & Jamal Shamsie, Capabilities in Motion: New Organizational
Forms and the Reshaping of the Hollywood Movie Industry, 40 J. MGMT. STUD. 2189, 2207
(2003).
157. A California state-court case in 1936 involving the famous actor James Cagney
concerned an oral agreement with respect to the number of films in which Cagney had agreed to
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early 1920s, at the inception of the studio-system era. Although the
timing may be merely suggestive, this sequence is consistent with an
organizational narrative in which informal contracting, and the
attendant holdup problems, appeared just before the start of the
studio system, which then sought to resolve those contracting
difficulties through vertical integration. As the studio system
unraveled, these same problems reappeared. In response, Hollywood
appears to have adopted both conventional one-shot contractual
mechanisms and an unconventional transactional mechanism that lies
somewhere between the alternatives of firm and market.
The soft contracts that govern relationships between studios and
stars (and, less consistently, other segments of the industry) fall
somewhere between three canonical transactional forms: long-term
formal contracting, short-term formal contracting, and repeated
informal contracting governed significantly by reputation effects.
Exploiting the two vectors of duration and formality, these
transactional options, and the Hollywood alternative, can be depicted
as shown below. The old studio system primarily operated in region I:
long-term formal contracting (interrupted by periodic renegotiations
at each option renewal for a high-value star). The unraveling of that
system appears to have pushed transactions between studios and the
general class of input providers into two transactional alternatives.
Transactions between a studio on the one side and noncreative input
providers and lower-value creative input providers on the other side
tend to operate in region II: short-term formal contracting.
Transactions between a studio and high-value creative input
providers, as well as some other parties, tend to operate in region III:
a boundary zone occupied by the unsigned deal—that is, a
substantially incomplete contractual instrument supported in part by
repeat-play reputational constraints, which are reflected by a
medium-term durational vector.

perform. See Terms of Cagney Deal Taxes Warner Memory, DAILY VARIETY, Mar. 5, 1936. This
dispute—like many other disputes at the time between studios and major stars—did not contest
the existence of a legally binding agreement between talent and the studio. Rather, such
disputes concerned the interpretation of specific contractual terms or whether specific terms had
been breached. Id.

BARNETT IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2015]

12/2/2014 10:34 PM

HOLLYWOOD DEALS

655

Figure 8. A Transactional Typology of Film Production
Legend
I: The “Studio System”:
All Input Providers

Formality
II

I

II: Post-Studio System:
Non-Creative Input
Providers and LowerValue Talent
III: Post-Studio System:
High-Value Talent;
Others

III

0

Duration

VI. BROADER IMPLICATIONS
I began by treating Hollywood’s predilection for soft contracting
as an anomalous phenomenon considered from the perspective of
conventional business-law practice. But the proposed economic
rationale for soft contracting implies that Hollywood may not be the
outlier it initially appears to be. Any industry that shares the
characteristics of the film industry—high holdup risk and outcome
uncertainty, high specification and enforcement costs, and positive
but limited reputational effects—should be expected to adopt some
form of soft-contracting instruments. If that is the case, then soft
contracting may carry normative implications for contract law in
general.
A. Soft Contracts Beyond Hollywood
Consistent with theoretical expectations, other markets also
adopt some form of soft-contracting instruments. The use of openended precontractual agreements reportedly characterizes some
technology-transfer, project-finance, and infrastructure projects, in
which negotiation is prolonged concurrently with staged
158
performance.
Soft-contracting instruments with uncertain
enforceability even appear in conventional business environments:
159
merchants exchange letters of credit with documentary defects; railfreight carriers and shippers use informal and legally unenforceable

158. See LAKE, supra note 36, at 54.
159. See Mann, supra note 32, at 2520.
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contracts to implicitly alter regulatory constraints; parent firms
sometimes issue “comfort letters” or “keepwell agreements” in
161
support of the financial obligations of a subsidiary; underwriters
commonly issue “best efforts” commitment letters to an issuer in
162
connection with initial public offerings;
and cable-television
operators enter into “unsigned but operative” agreements with video163
programming distributors. In refusing to enforce an unsigned LLC
agreement under the applicable statute of frauds, the Delaware
Chancery Court observed that private-equity funds sometimes use
oral agreements and “roughly-outlined unsigned arrangements or
164
draft agreements” in lieu of definitive LLC agreements. These oral
instruments are apparently so vital that private-equity funds
successfully lobbied the Delaware legislature to clarify that the statute
165
of frauds does not apply to those agreements.
B. Why Soft Contracts Matter for Contract Law
The widespread use of soft-contracting practices implies an
efficient purpose. Given that soft contracts require a legal regime in
which courts sometimes enforce underformalized agreements, the
historical relaxation of formalization thresholds in the common law of
166
may
contract and the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.)
therefore rest on an efficiency rationale. In Hollywood and
elsewhere, the relaxation of bright-line formalization thresholds
creates a zone of legal ambiguity in which parties often prefer to
transact. A legal regime that obfuscates the required level of
160. See Thomas M. Palay, Avoiding Regulatory Constraints: Contracting Safeguards and the
Role of Informal Agreements, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 155, 164–69 (1985) (highlighting the use of
informal, legally unenforceable contracts between rail-freight carriers and shippers).
161. See Guarantees and Other Forms of Explicit Support, DBRS (Aug. 2010), http://www
.dbrs.com/research/234322/dbrs-criteria-guarantees-and-other-forms-of-explicit-support.pdf
(distinguishing guarantees from keepwell agreements and comfort letters).
162. See LAKE, supra note 36, at 14–15.
163. See United States v. Comcast Corp., No. 11:1-CV-106, 2011 WL 5402137, at *9 (D.D.C.
Sept. 1, 2011).
164. Delaware Court Rules LLC Operating Agreements are Subject to Statute of Frauds,
Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy LLP (Nov. 10, 2008), http://www.milbank.com/images/
content/7/9/794/111008_Olson_v_Halvorsen.pdf (citing Olson v. Halversen, No. 1884-VCL, 2008
WL 4661831 (Del. Ch. Oct. 22, 2008), aff’d 986 A.2d 1150 (Del. 2009)).
165. 77 Del. Laws ch. 287 (2010). For discussion, see Milbank, supra note 164.
166. Section 1-201(3) of the U.C.C. discards the common law’s traditional narrow definition
of a legally enforceable contract in favor of a loose definition: “the bargain of the parties . . . as
found in their language or inferred from other circumstances, including course of performance,
course of dealing, or usage of trade.” U.C.C. § 1-201(3) (2001).
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formalization expands the universe of transactional opportunities for
167
efficient exchange.
A brief thought experiment can illustrate this argument. Suppose
California clarified and increased its formalization threshold. In this
example, courts would be prohibited from finding any agreement to
be enforceable absent mutual execution of a notarized agreement
initialed by both parties on each page of the document with
representation by a licensed attorney. That requirement eliminates
virtually all ambiguity over the availability of legal recourse but, for
the same reason, may distort parties’ efficient choice of contracting
form, and may even prevent certain transactions altogether. In an
environment characterized by sufficiently high specification costs and
sufficiently weak reputation effects, neither formal contract nor
reputational forces can independently induce participation by talent
and studio, which therefore bargain toward an intermediate level of
formalization that implies a limited likelihood of judicial
enforcement. Under the hypothetical California regime, however,
studio and talent would be precluded from using a soft-contracting
instrument, which would have no legal force and would therefore be
equivalent to entering into an informal agreement secured by nothing
but reputational pressures. As a result, studio and talent would be
forced to operate under a higher-than-desired level of formalization,
which would either require them to incur avoidable transaction costs
or, depending on the total value at stake, preclude the relevant
transaction altogether.
Ambiguous enforceability enables parties to operate in a low-F
contracting zone that relies on a mix of reputational and legal liability
to secure parties’ agreed-upon commitments at the lowest
transaction-cost burden. Upward adjustments in the formality
requirement would eliminate or curtail that ambiguous zone by
clarifying that low-F contracts entail zero legal risk. That would
compel parties to elect one of two inferior options: either high-F
agreements that are certainly enforceable but necessitate greater
transaction-cost expenditures to achieve the same expected outcome,
or agreements at all lower values of F that would now be certainly
167. Professor Geis makes a related argument with respect to parties’ use of strategic
ambiguity in the drafting of contracts, which he attributes to parties’ rational gamble on judicial
interpretation of the relevant terms ex post given their inability to reach agreement on the
meaning of those terms ex ante. That strategy depends on courts’ willingness to fill in gaps in
contracts that suffer from indefiniteness rather than deeming such contracts to be invalid. Geis,
supra note 31, at 1664.
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unenforceable and that would therefore convert to a zero-F contract
relying solely on reputational liability to constrain counterparty
168
opportunism. Given that parties already elect to operate in the lowF zone, which is characterized by limited expected liability and could
voluntarily substitute high-F or zero-F instruments, eliminating the
low-F zone entirely by raising the formality threshold for contract
enforceability to encompass only high-F contracts would necessarily
compel parties to adopt less efficient transactional forms. In extreme
cases, transactions would be entirely blocked: the high-F contracts
would impose excessive transactional burdens, while the remaining
option of a zero-F contract would leave parties vulnerable to
169
counterparty opportunism.
CONCLUSION
Conventional wisdom and standard business-law practice assume
that sophisticated parties prefer clearly enforceable contracts over
oral agreements or other informal communications that are
uncertainly enforceable. Hollywood appears to be an exception:
there, sophisticated parties in high-stakes transactions regularly select
intermediate levels of contractual formality that leave the
enforceability of the parties’ commitments unclear.
Hollywood dealmakers are neither reckless nor imprudent.
Legally ambiguous contracts provide the most efficient governance
mechanism whenever any alternative instrument, ranging from formal
contract to reputational exchange, cannot independently achieve a
superior expected outcome net of specification and enforcement
costs. Hollywood’s finely tailored transactional choices reflect a
continuous assessment of the marginal value of increased
formalization efforts in an environment in which holdup risk and
168. This actually seems to be the case with respect to transactions involving studios and
writers. As noted previously, interviewees reported that agreements with writers were always
done on a fully signed-up basis due to the statute of frauds with respect to the transfer of
copyright interests under the Copyright Act. See supra note 81. The statutory formalization
requirement therefore truncates a portion of the transactional universe in studio–writer
relationships.
169. This is not intended as a definitive argument in favor of relaxed formalization
requirements. As is widely argued, reducing the formalization threshold may allow courts to
protect unsophisticated parties who unwittingly rely on insufficiently formalized commitments
due to ignorance of the law. But the opposite can also be true: reducing formalization thresholds
may enable sophisticated parties to exploit unsophisticated parties who unwittingly take on
contractual liability due to ignorance of the law. The precise balancing of these social costs and
benefits is inherently indeterminate.
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outcome uncertainty are high, formal contracting requires significant
specification and enforcement expenditures, reputation effects are
salient but unreliable, and vertical integration is no longer
economically viable. Close analysis shows that Hollywood’s
predilection for ambiguously enforceable contracts is neither
anomalous nor irrational. Rather, it illustrates an overlooked
alternative on the transactional spectrum that extends from formal
markets of single-shot contracting parties protected by law, to
informal communities of repeat players constrained by reputation.
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APPENDIX A

REPORTED CONTRACT-FORMATION DISPUTES INVOLVING TALENT
AND STUDIO OR OTHER PRODUCTION ENTITY IN FILM AND
170
TELEVISION PROJECTS (THROUGH JULY 2014)
Legend:
T = talent; S = studio (or other production entity or individual producer)
O = oral; W = written
U = unknown
Year

Parties (T/S)

Film or Television Project
(Actual or Proposed)

Type of
Agmt

Party in
Alleged
Breach

Outcome

1923
1924
1947
1948

A. Jolson/D.W. Griffith
D. Collins/Bennett et al.
Johnston/20th C. Fox
De Toth/Columbia
Pictures
Mason/Rose

His Darker Self
Queen of the Flat Top
The Clock Struck Twelve
n/a (long-term contract)

O
O
O
O

T
S
S
T

Enforced
U
Enforced
Enforced

n/a (series of movies)171

W

S

N. Algren/Roberts Prods.
Inc.
B. Davis/Ramon Romero
Werker/M. Briskin,
Morjay Prods. et al.
Unidentified
Actress/RKO
Skirball/RKO
H. Lloyd/California
Pictures Corp.
B. Donlevy/Carthy Prods.
S. Hayden/Warner Bros.
C. Heston/Warner Bros.
K. Briggs/MGM et al.
Holden/Paramount

The Man with the Golden
Arm
Mrs. Lincoln
Cry Tough

O

T

Not
Enforced
U

O
O/W

T
S

U
U

Not specified

O

S

U

Appointment in Samarra
Mad Wednesday

O
O

S
S

Enforced
Remanded

King of Hearts
Tension at Table Rock
Darby’s Rangers
High School Confidential
The Horse Soldiers

O
O
U
O
O

T
S
S
S
T

U
U
Settled
U
Not
Enforced

1949
1950
1950
1952
1952
1955
1955
1956
1956
1957
1958
1958

170. I gathered all the information presented here through the Lexis-Nexis and Westlaw
databases, the Daily Variety digital archives, and other trade-press sources. All disputes involve
the filing of lawsuits except two matters (as indicated) and an arbitration through the Writers
Guild of America (WGA), which is also indicated. Any dispute for which the outcome is
indicated as “enforced” or “not enforced” indicates that a court or jury reached a final
determination, in which case the dispute is included in the list of judicial opinions in App. B.
Sources for all other items were located through the Daily Variety archives and other trade
publications, which can be found by the source’s year of publication and party’s name as listed
in App. C. I restricted my search to contract-formation disputes involving talent (that is, writers,
directors, and actors) and a studio (including any type of production company or individual
producer). I excluded talent–studio disputes involving claimed contracts relating to a particular
term of an agreement but that did not raise any doubt as to talent’s or studio’s commitment to
perform, and “idea submission” disputes involving allegations by a writer or producer that a
studio or other production entity misappropriated an idea pitched to the studio or production
entity. For brevity, I do not always list all parties’ names.
171. Joint venture to form a production company.
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Year

Parties (T/S)

Film or Television Project
(Actual or Proposed)

Type of
Agmt

Party in
Alleged
Breach

Outcome

1959

K. Frings/United Artists
et al.
Carter/Milestone

Two for the Seesaw

O

S

U

Operation Mad Ball

W

S

R. Parrish/Omat Prods.
J. Landis/J. Gentile
B. Breen/Samuel
Goldwyn Co.
C. Odets/MGM
A. Quinn/United Artists

Brotherhood of Evil
Tragedy in a Small Town
Porgy & Bess

O
O
O

S
S
T

The Actor
The Magnificent Seven

O
O

S
S

Boyd/T. Mann, Benton
Film Prods.
D. Murphy/G. Conway et
al.
F. Dunaway/O.
Preminger
P. Lawford/Embassy
Pictures and Paramount
E. Taylor, R. Burton/J.
Blaustein
E. Silverstein/Warner
Bros.
M. von Sydow, L.
Ullman/MGM
J. Palance/S. Peckinpah et
al.
N. Montex/20th C. Fox

The U Battle

O

S

Not
Enforced
U
U172
Not
Enforced
U
Not
Enforced
U

This Hero Breed

O

T

U

Hurry Sundown

O

T

Settled

Something Beginning with M

O

T

U

The Taming of the Shrew

O

T

Dismissed

Nobody Loves a Drunken
Indian
Man’s Fate

O

S

U

O

S

U

The Getaway

O

T

U

Che

O

S

Dismissed

Ann Carver’s Profession

O

S

U

1984

F. Dolan/Columbia
Pictures
M. Steenburgen/MGM

Roadshow

O

S

Settled

1986

F. De Felitta/Polygram

Sea Trial

O

S

U

1987

R. Dangerfield/Warner
Bros.
B. Lancaster/Columbia
Pictures
A. Pacino/E. Kastner,
Cinema Corp.
B. De Palma, O.
Litto/Orion Pictures
Pinckney/Valente-Kritzer

Caddyshack II

O

S

Settled

The Old Gringo

O/W

S

U

Carlito’s Way

O

T

U

Dressed to Kill

O

S

U

Callenetics

O

S

1991

E. Lloyd/Orion Pictures

Mermaids

O

S

Not
Enforced
Settled

1991

García Márquez/Roth

Love in the Time of Cholera

W

T

1992

J. Mattson/De Laurentiis
Productions
H. King/Inspiration
Pictures

Milk Money

O

T

Not
Enforced
U

Romola

O

S

Settled173

1959
1960
1961
1963
1963
1964
1964
1965
1968
1968
1968
1969
1971
1972
1973
1976

1988
1989
1989
1989

1992

172. WGA arbitration.
173. Settlement is assumed based on the fact that the plaintiff-director who claimed breach
by the studio directed the film. See Romola (1924)—IMDb, IMDB, http://www.imdb.com/title/
tt0015289 (last visited Nov. 18, 2014).
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Year

Parties (T/S)

Film or Television Project
(Actual or Proposed)

Type of
Agmt

Party in
Alleged
Breach

Outcome

1992

R. Mulcahy/Davis-Panzer
Prods.
Konigsberg/Rice

Highlander III

O

T

U

The Mummy

O

T

K. Basinger/Main Line
A. Bening/Samuel
Goldwyn Co.
J. Milius/Price
Entertainment
W. Goldberg/T Rex Prod.
Co.
P. Anderson/Private
Movie Co.
J. Travolta/Mandalay
Entertainment
J. Foster/Polygram
F. Dunaway/L. Persky
M. Myers/Universal
F.F. Coppola/Warner
Bros.
Rappaport/Buske

Boxing Helena
The Playboys

O
O

T
T

Not
Enforced
Enforced
Settled

Texas Rangers

O

S

U

T. Rex

O

T

Settled

Hello, She Lied

O

T

The Double

O

T

Not
Enforced
Settled

The Game
Master Class
Dieter
Pinocchio

O
O
O
O/W

S
S
T
T

Fabulously Fit and Famous

O

S

Basic Instinct 2

O

S

Victim of Deceit
Mother and Child
The Rising
Me Again
State of Play
Pope Joan

O
W
O
W
O
O

T
S
T
S
S
T

2008

S. Stone/Unnamed Prod.
Co.
T. Kaye/Flashwork Prods.
Lombardo/Mauriello
Rai/Unidentified Studio
D. Lane/Intermedia Films
B. Pitt/Universal
J. Goodman/Constantin
Films
Hansen/Geisler

Desperadoes

W

S

2009

Shade/Gorman

American Heroes

W

S

2010

Fiat Risus (R.
Williams)/Gold Circle
Films
Fraser/Moyer et al.
C. Scorsese/Jumpview
Entertainment
Howard/Arnett

Cop Out (formerly titled A
Couple of Dicks)

W

T

Not specified
Campus Life

W
O

S
S

Pending
Pending

Overcoming Life’s Trauma

O

T

Enforced

1993
1993
1993
1993
1993
1995
1997
1997
1997
1998
1998
2000
2001
2002
2002
2003
2003
2007
2007

2012
2013
2014

U
Settled
Settled
Not
Enforced
Not
Enforced
Suit Withdrawn
Dismissed
Enforced
U
Settled
Settled174
Settled
Not
enforced
Not
Enforced
Not
Enforced

174. No lawsuit was filed. The parties resolved their dispute once an acceptable replacement
for Brad Pitt was found. See Baz Bamigboye, Russell Crowe in Secret Deal to Save Brad Pitt
from
Lawsuit,
MAIL
ONLINE,
Apr.
23,
2009,
available
at
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/tvshowbiz/article-1172991/BAZ-BAMIGBOYE-Russell-Crowsecret-deal-save-Brad-Pitt-lawsuit.html.
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APPENDIX B
PUBLISHED OR OTHER REPORTED JUDICIAL DECISIONS INVOLVING
CONTRACT-FORMATION DISPUTES IN FILM AND TELEVISION
175
PROJECTS (THROUGH JULY 2014)
Legend:
O = oral agreement
W = written agreement (deal memo, letter agreement, unsigned long-form agreement)
Def. = definite (certainty, agreement on all material terms)
Indef. = indefinite (uncertainty, lack of agreement on essential terms, vagueness)
Case (Year)

D.W. Griffith Co. v. Jolson
(1923) (Jolson, Out of
Film, Sued for $571,696,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 25, 1924,
at 20)
Johnston v. Twentieth
Century Fox Film Corp.,
187 P.2d 474 (Cal. Ct. App.
1947)
Columbia Pictures Corp. v.
De Toth, 197 P.2d 580 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1948)
Mason v. Rose, 176 F.2d
486 (2d Cir. 1949)
Skirball v. RKO Radio
Pictures, 286 P.2d 954 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1955)
Paramount Pictures Corp.
v. Holden, 166 F. Supp. 684
(C.D. Cal. 1958)

Type
of
Agmt
O

Parties

Enf’d?

Grounds

Governing
Law176

Studio/actor

Y

Def.

New York

O

Writer/studio

Y

Def.

California

O

Studio/director

Y

Def.

California

W

Actor/studio177

N

Indef.

O

Producer/
studio

Y

Def.

United
Kingdom;
California
California

O

Studio/actor

N178

No injunctive
relief for oral
contracts.

California

175. I identified the cases presented here through the Westlaw and Lexis-Nexis databases,
with the following geographic and date limitations: all federal, New York, and California courts
from start of database coverage through July 31, 2014; and all state courts (except New York
and California) from January 1, 1980, through July 31, 2014. As noted above, some opinions
appear in the electronic database but are unpublished. Various search terms were used for
purposes of identifying fully litigated cases that primarily involved a film or television
production and addressed the enforceability of an oral or written agreement—excluding cases
that addressed only the enforceability of a particular term in an otherwise-enforceable oral or
written agreement and cases that involved idea submission scenarios. As indicated above, two
cases were identified solely through trade-press sources. See App. C. for full citation
information.
176. Governing law refers to state law as selected in a claimed written contract; state law as
designated by the court in the case of a claimed oral contract or claimed written contract that
did not specify governing law; and federal law in the case of a claimed violation of § 204(a) of
the Copyright Act (its statute-of-frauds provision).
177. Joint venture to form production company.
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Case (Year)

Carter v. Milestone, 338
P.2d 569 (Cal. Ct. App.
1959)
Breen v. Samuel Goldwyn
Co. (1963) (Los Angeles
Superior Court) (Daily
Variety 1963)
Anthony Quinn v. United
Artists, et al. (Los Angeles
Superior Court, 1964)
(Daily Variety 1964)
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer,
Inc. v. Scheider, 352
N.Y.S.2d 205 (App. Div.
1974)
Sawyer v. Sickinger, 366
N.Y.S.2d 435 (App. Div.
1975)
Jillcy Film Enters., Inc. v.
Home Box Office, Inc., 593
F. Supp. 515 (S.D.N.Y.
1984)
Winston v. Mediafare
Entm’t Corp., 777 F.2d 78
(2d Cir. 1985)
Valente-Kritzer Video v.
Pinckney, 881 F.2d 772 (9th
Cir. 1989)
Effects Ass’ns, Inc. v.
Cohen, 908 F.2d 555 (9th
Cir. 1990)
Roth v. Garcia Marquez,
942 F.2d 617 (9th Cir. Cal.
1991)
Geoquest Prods., Ltd. v.
Embassy Home Entm’t,
593 N.E.2d 727 (Ill. App.
1992)
Konigsberg Int’l, Inc. v.
Rice, 16 F.3d 355 (9th Cir.
1993)
Main Line Pictures, Inc. v.
Basinger, 1994 WL 814244
(Cal. App. 1994)
Trimark Pictures, Inc. v.
August Entm’t, Inc., No.
B089266 (Cal. App. Dec.
12, 1996)

DUKE LAW JOURNAL
Type
of
Agmt
W

Parties

Enf’d?

Grounds

Governing
Law176

Writer/
producer

N

Indef.

California

O

Director/
producer

N

Not stated

California

O

Actor/studio

N

Not stated

California

O

Studio/actor

Y

Statute of frauds
defense
unavailable

New York

O

Producer/
producer

N

Statute of frauds

New York

W/O

Producer/
network

N

Statute of frauds;
indef.

New York

W/O

Agent/
producer

N

No intent to be
bound

New York

O

Producer/
writer

N

Copyright statute
of frauds

Federal;
California

O

Video-effects
firm/producer

Y

Implied
nonexclusive
license

Federal

W

Producer/
writer

N

Indef.; agreement
to agree

California

O

Producer/
videocassette
distributor

N

Def.

Illinois

O

Producer/
writer

N

Copyright statute
of frauds

Federal

W/O

Studio/actor

Y

Def.

California

W

Producer/
distributor

N

Statute of frauds

Federal

178. The court declined to rule on the existence of a binding contract (the determination of
which was remanded to the lower court), but also declined to issue an injunction against the
actor’s working for another employer during the contract term due to the absence of a written
agreement. I therefore treat this outcome as the functional equivalent of the court’s having
declined to enforce the claimed contract.

BARNETT IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2015]
Case (Year)

The Private Movie Co., Inc.
v. Pamela Anderson, No.
BC 136805 (Cal. Super. Ct.
Oct. 10, 1995)
Coppola et al. v. Warner
Bros., Inc., No. BC 135198
(Cal. Super. Ct. July 12,
1998)
Radio TV Espanola S.A. v.
New World Entm’t, Ltd.,
183 F.3d 922 (9th Cir.
1999)
Rappaport v. Buske, 2000
WL 1224828 (S.D.N.Y.
Aug. 29, 2000)
Lombardo v. Mauriello,
2002 WL 31492393 (Mass.
Super. Ct. 2002)
Zenga v. Brillstein-Grey
Entm’t, 2003 WL 22482067
(Cal. App. 2003)
Baer v. Chase, 392 F.3d 609
(3d Cir. 2004)
Portman v. Zoetrope,
Corp., 2005 WL 1077504
(Cal. App. 2005)
In re My Left Hook, LLC,
129 F. App’x 352 (9th Cir.
2005)
Lyrick Studios, Inc. v. Big
Idea Prods., Inc., 420 F.3d
388 (5th Cir. 2005)
Network Enters. v. APBA
Offshore Prods., Inc., 427
F. Supp. 2d 463 (S.D.N.Y.
2005)
Hansen v. Geisler, 2008
WL 5375241 (S. Ct. N.Y.
Dec. 4, 2008)
The Weinstein Co. v.
Smokewood Entm’t Grp.,
LLC, 664 F. Supp. 2d 332
(S.D.N.Y 2009)
Shade v. Gorman, 2009 WL
196400 (N.D. Cal. 2009)
Fiat Risus, Inc. v. Frank
and Beans Productions
LLC, No. BC400180 (Cal.
Super. Ct. Feb. 5, 2010)
Trademark Props., Inc. v.
A&E Television Networks,
422 F. App’x 199 (4th Cir.
2011)
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Type
of
Agmt
O

Parties

Enf’d?

Grounds

Governing
Law176

Studio/actor

N

Indef.

California

W/O

Director/
studio

N

Indef., statute of
frauds

Federal;
California

W

Network/
production
company

N

Copyright statute
of frauds

Federal

O

News reporter/
producer

N

New York

W

Writer/
producer

Y

Indef.; lack of
intent to be
bound.
Def.

O

Producer/
studio

N

Indef.

California

O

Producer/
consultant
Producer/
producer

N

Indef.

N

Indef.

New
Jersey
California

Production
company/
financiers
Studiodistributor/
production
company
Cable network/
producer
(broadcast of
sports event)
Writer/
producer

N

Indef.

California

N

Copyright statute
of frauds

Federal

Y179

Intent to be
bound

New York

N

No consideration

New York

O

Studio/
producer

N

Federal;
New York

W

Videographer/
studio
Actor/
production
company

N
N

Copyright statute
of frauds; lack of
intention to be
bound
Disclaimer of
intent to be bound
Indef.

Y

Def.

New York

W

W

W

W/O

W

W

O

Creator/televisi
on network

179. Agreement to negotiate in good faith.

Massachusetts

California
California
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Case (Year)

Swan Media Grp., Inc. v.
Staub, 841 F. Supp. 2d 804
(S.D.N.Y. 2012)
Queen v. Schultz, 888 F.
Supp. 2d 145 (D.D.C.
2012), rev’d on other
grounds, 747 F.3d 879
(D.C. Cir. 2014)
Arnett v. Howard, No. 2:13cv-591, 2014 WL 1165851
(D. Utah Mar. 21, 2014)

DUKE LAW JOURNAL
Type
of
Agmt
W

Parties

Enf’d?

Grounds

Governing
Law176

Media
group/actor

N

Indef.

New York

O

Consultant/TV
show host

N

Indef.

D.C.

O

Director/
producer;
performer

Y

Def.

Utah
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APPENDIX C
TRADE-PRESS SOURCES FOR UNSIGNED-DEAL DISPUTES

180

Legend:
DV = Daily Variety
HR = Hollywood Reporter
Date

Author

Title

Publication

1924 (Nov. 5)
1924 (Apr. 25)
1936 (Mar. 5)

n/a
n/a
n/a

DV
N.Y. Times
DV

1946 (Apr. 11)

n/a

1949 (Oct.)
1950 (Feb. 13)
1950 (Jan. 17)
1952 (July 2)
1952 (July 17)

n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a

1952 (Oct. 22)

n/a

1956 (Aug. 2)
1956 (Aug. 23)

n/a
n/a

1958 (June 26)

n/a

1959 (Sept. 8)

n/a

1960 (May 12)

n/a

1961 (Mar. 17)
1963 (Mar. 12)

n/a
n/a

1963 (June 5)

n/a

1963 (Mar. 27)
1964 (Apr. 16)
1964 (Dec. 2)

n/a
n/a
n/a

1965 (Aug. 13)

n/a

1968 (Jan. 17)

n/a

1968 (Apr. 23)
1968 (Nov. 27)
1970 (Sept. 18)
1971 (Oct. 28)

n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a

1972 (June 8)
1972 (Oct. 30)
1975 (June 5)

n/a
n/a
Tusher

1976 (June 30)
1984 (Sept. 5)

n/a
n/a

Dana Collins in Court Over Lost Picture Role.
Jolson, Out of Film, Sued for $571,696.
Terms of Cagney Deal Taxes Warner
Memory.
20th Loses $20,000 Suit on Oral “Flat Tops”
Deal.
Hollywood Inside.
Golden Arms’ Rights Subject to Suit.
Ramon Romero Sues Bette Davis for 142G.
RKO Letterheads Cited in Stars’ Suit.
Hughes Ponders Signing Settlement or Taking
Stand in Simmons Trial.
Werker Sues Mori Briskin; Charges Oral Pad
Breach.
Carthy Sues Donlevy.
Hayden Suit Charges RKO Breached Oral
Agreement; Asks 35G.
17-Year-Old Girl Sues Over Metro ‘High
School Confidential’.
Ketti Frings’ 75G Suit Charging Breach vs.
UA, SA, Mirisch on ‘Seesaw’.
Red Button Sues for 40G; 3d Claim Damages
Against Ill-Fated ‘Evil’.
WGA To Arbitrate ‘Small’ Plot Dispute.
Attorney Jams Himself Trying It On Goldwyn
in Bob Breen’s Action.
Odets Sez Deal Favoring Actor Ruined
Writer’s Profit.
Breen Fails in Suit; Sam Goldwyn Pleased
Boyd Sues Tony Mann.
Not Legally Binding: Tony Quinn Loses
Action on Brynner ‘Promise’.
Legal Heroics: Actors, Producer Sue Film
Writer For $1,254,804.
N.Y. Court Stalls Prem Injunction Against
Dunaway.
Lawford Sues Par, Embassy for 150G.
Dismiss Blaustein Suit.
Silverstein Sues Warner for 351G.
Max von Sydow and Liz Ullman Sue Over
‘Man’s Fate’.
Jack Palance Sues Sam Peckinpah.
20th Wins Dismissal of Nene Montez Suit.
Troubled Tandem Hails Warning to Balky
Stars.
Fired Much Too Soon, Dolan Sues Columbia.
Steenburgen Sues MGM for 10 Mil.

DV
DV
DV
DV
DV
DV
DV
DV
DV
DV
DV
DV
DV
DV
DV
DV
DV
DV
DV
DV
DV
DV
DV
DV
DV
DV
HR
DV
DV

180. All Daily Variety articles were accessed through the Variety digital archive.
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Date

Author

Title

Publication

1986 (Mar. 13)
1988 (June 8)

n/a
n/a

DV
DV

1988 (Sept. 27)

Beck

1989 (May 12)
1989 (Nov. 1)

n/a
Lieberman

1991 (June 6)

Rapportoni

1992 (Oct. 8)
1992 (Nov. 24)
1992 (Dec. 5)
1993 (Apr. 5)
1993 (Sept. 18)

n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
Pristin

1997 (July 14)
1997 (Oct. 31)
2002 (Apr. 2)
2003 (Nov. 24)
2004 (May 12)
2006 (Mar. 31)
2007 (Aug. 4)
2007 (Nov. 23)

n/a
Archerd
Bing
Bharataniyer
n/a
n/a
Meza
n/a

2008 (Oct. 20)
2010 (Feb. 5)
2012 (May 11)
2013 (July 8)

Child
n/a
Gardner
Gardner

De Fellita Sues Polygram Over ‘Trial’ Rights.
Lancaster Slaps Col With Suit For ‘Old
Gringo’ Firing.
Dangerfield is picky about scripts for his
movies.
Kastern Sues Pacino For Contract Breach.
DePalma and Litto Testify as “Dressed” Trial
Opens.
Former Uni ‘Deal-Maker’ Testifies in ‘Pirates’
Trial.
King Can’t Cut Romola.
De Laurentiis Sues Scripter, Agent.
Mulcahy Sued Over ‘Highlander III’.
In Basinger’s Wake, Bening Settles Suit.
Whoopi Goldberg Ends Breach-of-Contract
Suit.
Double trouble irks legal eagles.
Just for Variety.
Kaye’s Cautionary Tale.
Thesp’s success leads to salary strife.
Diane Lane settles suit with film house.
Basic Instinct 2 (2006): Did You Know?
Goodman Sued After Refusing ‘Joan’ Job.
Brad Pitt Pulls Out of Universal film, risking
lawsuit.
Robin Williams unamused by pay dispute.
Robin Williams Loses $6 Million Lawsuit.
Hollywood Docket: Brendan Fraser sues.
Martin Scorsese Plays Odd Role in Daughter’s
Legal Dispute.

St. Petersburg
Times
DV
DV
DV
DV
DV
DV
DV
L.A. Times
DV
DV
DV
DV
UPI
IMDb
DV
AFP
The Guardian
Reuters
HR
HR
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APPENDIX D
INTERVIEWS
All interviews were conducted by telephone or in-person (as
specified below) on an anonymous basis, in Los Angeles, and on the
dates indicated below. All interviewees are active participants in the
film and television industries located in Southern California, either in a
legal, business, or mixed legal and business capacity. The reference
term is that used to refer to each interview in the text of the article.
Date(s)

Interviewee

Reference Term

Studio Counsel
February 8, 2011

Former general counsel at
major studio

Studio Counsel Interview I

Multiple dates in February–
December 2011, March 2013

In-house counsel at major
studio

Studio Counsel Interview II

August 29, 2011

In-house counsel at major
studio

Studio Counsel Interview III

Multiple dates in February–
December, 2011; March 2013

General counsel at “mini–
major” independent studio

Mini–Major Counsel Interview

Studio Executives
Studio Executive Interview

April 16, 2013

Former chief executive of
major studio

May 31, 2011; email
communication, Sept. 9, 2012

Senior attorney with
entertainment practice

Entertainment Attorney Interview
I

June 2, 2011

Law-firm partner with
entertainment practice

Entertainment Attorney Interview
II

April 9, 2013

Law-firm partner with
entertainment practice

Entertainment Attorney Interview
III

Entertainment Attorneys

